Chinese Defector-Spy Reveals How to Spot Beijing’s Agents
Udumbara
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A former Chinese intelligence agent says it’s difficult to detect Beijing’s many spies operating in countries like Canada and the United States, but says there are nevertheless some clues that can give their hidden identity away.
The former agent, who goes by the pseudonym “Eric,” defected to Australia in 2023.
Eric worked for China’s Ministry of Public Security for more than 10 years, spanning from 2008 until he was recalled to China in 2022, he told The Epoch Times. He says he was a pro-democracy activist and was forced to work for the Chinese regime, and defected when the conditions allowed.
During his time as an undercover agent, Eric monitored dissidents abroad. One of his assignments involved monitoring overseas Chinese dissident Hua Yong, who openly criticized the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and leader Xi Jinping.
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Detecting China’s Spies
Eric told The Epoch Times in Chinese that determining whether someone is operating as a spy outside China can be “very difficult” and can even require extensive effort for professional intelligence agencies.“Some spies are well disguised, and each spy’s abilities are different. For those with high capabilities, it can be extremely hard to detect them,” he said.
He noted however that intelligence systems in authoritarian states have “inherent defects and weaknesses” that individuals working as undercover agents “can’t fully overcome.” For example, spies can’t always make decisions on their own, and in many cases must seek approval from their higher-ups, he said.
Testing to see whether an individual can make decisions on their own is one way to determine whether that person is a spy, Eric said. With some matters, Beijing’s agents may only respond with vague words or verbal promises and will not make an immediate decision on the spot because they must first report to their superiors, he said.
“This gives overseas dissidents a way to test people: see whether someone can make decisions on the spot in important matters,” Eric said. “If a person can’t decide many things by themselves and has a very long reaction time, the suspicion that they might be an agent increases.”
Canada One of China’s ‘Key Targets’
Eric said Canada is one of Beijing’s “key targets” due to its lenient immigration policies, less-robust counterintelligence capabilities compared to the United States, and its membership in key organizations such as the Five Eyes that are highly sought targets of the CCP.“Canada is, in the eyes of the CCP, a relatively easy country to infiltrate,” Eric said. “Its immigration policies, for instance, are more lenient and inclusive compared to other members of the Five Eyes alliance. That gives the CCP more opportunities to send people and establish networks.”
He said the United States has “far more robust intelligence and counterespionage” capabilities than Canada does, giving Beijing “more room to operate” in Canada.
Infiltrating Canada would also allow the CCP to access sensitive data from Canada’s allies shared through alliances such as the Five Eyes, of which the United States is also a member, he said.
“Because of Canada’s proximity to the United States, the CCP sometimes prefers to send agents there first—it’s safer to enter and exit the United States from Canada than to operate directly under America’s powerful counterintelligence scrutiny,” he said.
“Given all these factors, it’s no surprise that CCP infiltration in Canada is particularly serious.”
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While Japan has approximately 40 diplomats in Canada and India has approximately 30, China has 176 diplomats in Canada, he said, adding that Canada doesn’t have “anything like that number of diplomats in China.”
“The question is, are Chinese diplomats so inefficient that they need such large numbers to engage in legitimate diplomatic function, or is it that about 70 percent of them are engaged in espionage, influence operations, harassment of Canadians of Chinese origin, and other things which are not consistent with their diplomatic function?” Burton said.
Eric told The Epoch Times that all the provincial public security departments and ministries in China send people abroad, not just the central authorities. The total number of people working for Beijing in Canada could exceed 1,000 if all those who cooperate with the Chinese regime’s work are taken into account, Eric noted, adding that this includes those who recruit students to monitor classmates, file reports, or go to dissident gatherings to take photos, harass, and create disturbances.
He added that Falun Gong is a prime target of the CCP, with the regime closely monitoring practitioners overseas.
When dealing with dissidents inside China, Beijing relies heavily on technical tools like surveillance cameras and big data, he said. Meanwhile, China relies more on human intelligence and cyber operations by planting malware on computers with weak cybersecurity systems when dealing with dissidents abroad, he added.
The former China operative said Canada and allies could confront the issue more effectively if they give it appropriate priority.
“If Western governments—including the Five Eye countries—take this issue seriously, I believe they do have the capacity to counter CCP espionage,” Eric said, noting that Western intelligence agencies need to collaborate and engage with Chinese communities and targeted groups to combat Beijing’s infiltration.
“No country can effectively counter the CCP alone. The CCP often uses a human-wave strategy in intelligence work due to its large population. Even a country as large as the United States may find it challenging to handle this alone. Cooperation and intelligence-sharing among allies are essential,” he said.
Hua Yong Case
Eric said his work in Canada as an undercover agent for Beijing was mainly focused on Hua’s case, although there were “many other targets.”He noted that Hua had regularly criticized Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the CCP and had become a target for the CCP. Many people were surprised that Hua had escaped from China and wondered how he managed it, but Eric said the Chinese regime is “not always airtight” and there are loopholes.
“If you take some bold and sudden action at an unexpected moment, sometimes it can succeed,” Eric said, adding that the controls placed on Hua’s movements and border exit were “probably not yet very tight.”
Once outside China, Hua continued his anti-CCP activities, organizing movements to oppose the regime.
“If it is just an individual criticizing them, they may not care that much, but once you create organized opposition, they take it seriously,” Eric said, adding that it was on this basis that he was assigned to monitor Hua.
Hua initially settled in Thailand, but then came to Canada on a humanitarian protection visa in 2021. In November 2022, while kayaking off the Sunshine Coast in B.C., he drowned, according to the RCMP. Police said that a thorough investigation into the case has been completed, and that the death has not been ruled as suspicious.
Eric says he still has his suspicions about the case, adding that there have been other teams of Chinese secret agents in Canada working on Hua’s case.
In Hua’s case, Eric says his job was to get close to him and find out detailed information about him, including his whereabouts and places of residence. He said he suspected the regime had wanted to pinpoint Hua’s residence and act against him, but he “never deliberately helped them do that” and didn’t particularly try to find out Hua’s address.
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“For many tasks, I intentionally dragged things out or used various methods so that the assignments essentially went nowhere,” Eric said.
He also said his immediate superiors had suspicions about him. In a conversation log that Eric previously made public, one of his superiors expressed dissatisfaction or suspicion, saying that after so many years Eric hadn’t helped catch any dissidents and his attitude always seemed unenthusiastic.
Leaving the CCP
Before becoming an undercover agency, Eric said he was pro-democracy and had an “anti-communist mindset.” He had joined a pro-democracy group, but he said the Chinese regime found out and pressured him to work for it by threatening to put him in prison and involve his family.“I chose to make a temporary compromise. I actually had a plan in mind at the time: first make a verbal compromise, bow my head for the moment, and then see what to do later,” Eric said.
He says he was recalled to China in 2022 and his assignments began to dwindle, and by early 2023, he severed ties altogether and defected to Australia.
