National Interests Dictate That the US–Greenland Relationship Be Redefined

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Still, regardless of the deal’s details, the reasons that prompted Trump to push for acquiring Greenland have not changed.

Yet some continue to believe the status quo is just fine. After all, the 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement with Denmark allowed the United States to build 50 military installations in Greenland during the Cold War. Consequently, why not just utilize it as was done during the Cold War?

China, as a self-described “Near Arctic State,” views the Arctic’s 22 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and vast mineral resources as critical and is partnering with Russia to gain a presence and compete for resources.

Russia, with the world’s largest fleet—more than 50 vessels, including eight nuclear-powered—continues to expand its fleet faster than the United States, enabling it to maintain year-round dominance over routes like the Northern Sea Route.

But with Greenland, the United States jumps to controlling about 26 percent of the Arctic Ocean coastline and 27 to 30 percent of the Arctic landmass, solidly positioning itself to compete with Russia’s and China’s growing presence.

Uncoincidentally, China’s rapidly growing presence in the Arctic mirrors Greenland’s growing importance, driven by reduced polar ice coverage that has opened up once-impassable sea lanes and territories. Increased accessibility to the Arctic Sea and landmasses has enabled vastly expanded merchant shipping, greater access to vast natural resources, and increased potential for human habitation. It has also heightened the need for the United States to secure its northern borders, as more Chinese and Russian naval vessels—some equipped with missiles capable of striking the United States—ply the waters near Greenland.

Greenland sits strategically along key Arctic shipping routes: the Northwest Passage along North America’s northern coastline and the Transpolar Sea Route through the Arctic Ocean’s center. Rising ship traffic, both military and commercial, due to reduced ice, makes Greenland far more vital than during the Cold War.

Roughly two-thirds of Greenland lies within the Arctic Circle, positioning it as an ideal staging area that complements the limited Arctic territory the United States controls through Alaska. However, even with full leverage of Greenland, securing commensurate Arctic influence will be a challenge.

While Greenland holds substantial reserves of rare-earth elements and oil, extracting them will be challenging; their immediate value lies in securing the U.S. northern flank. Denmark, with a military of only 20,000, and Greenland, with a population about the size of a mid-sized town at 56,000, are not militarily capable of securing the U.S. northern flank and could be susceptible in the future to overtures from China, and maybe even Russia once the Ukraine war is far back in the rear-view mirror.

Some believe this treaty remains adequate to U.S. national security needs, with Mikkel Runge Olesen, a researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, asserting, “The U.S. has such a free hand in Greenland that it can pretty much do what it wants.” However, this view is mistaken because the strategic environment has changed profoundly since 1951.

Greenland is no longer merely a Cold War outpost for monitoring Soviet bombers or hosting limited facilities. Today, it is central to great-power competition in the Arctic, where Russia and China are aggressively expanding their influence through naval operations, resource claims, and infrastructure projects. For Greenland to serve as an effective staging ground, it will need to be strengthened both militarily and economically.

The 1951 agreement, while sufficient for the Cold War, does not provide the scale, speed, and flexibility needed as melting ice opens new sea routes. It is insufficient to counter Russia–China’s competition over Arctic resources. Denmark’s input on priorities, potential vetoes of new installations outside existing areas, or differing views on what constitutes “necessary” developments will create delays and damaging compromises. The treaty’s framework, rooted in mutual consultation and NATO plans, limits unilateral U.S. action, hindering comprehensive, decisive responses to the current threat environment.

Although the United States no longer maintains 50 military installations on Greenland, as it did during the height of the Cold War, it is poised to expand its military presence well beyond what it was then. This includes expanding the Pituffik Space Base, the northernmost U.S. military installation; supporting missile warning, missile defense, and space surveillance; establishing a naval base to enhance operations in Arctic waters; and deploying substantial Golden Dome missile defense emplacements to bolster early warning and interception capabilities against threats from Russia and China. These steps reflect the escalating strategic demands of great-power competition in the Arctic, where melting ice opens new routes and heightens the need for robust U.S. deterrence and control.

Along with its military importance, Greenland’s future economic value, while not fully realizable now because of an environment that makes resource extraction very difficult, is substantial, with vast untapped deposits of rare-earth elements, oil, natural gas, and critical minerals essential for technology. But regardless of when economics and technological advances allow Greenland’s resources to be extracted, Greenland is a pivotal asset for securing supply chains and countering adversaries.