US Tightens Controls on Tech Investment in Chinese Companies, Supply Chain Security

US Tightens Controls on Tech Investment in Chinese Companies, Supply Chain Security

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President Donald Trump on Dec. 18 signed into law a tighter outbound investment screening regime to stop U.S. capital from funding Chinese high-tech companies.

The revised version of the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act of 2025 (COINS Act) was enacted as a part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026.

The $901 billion defense bill also includes a raft of new powers to strengthen supply chain security and improve the government’s China expertise.

The Guaranteeing Access and Innovation for National Artificial Intelligence Act (GAIN AI Act), which would require advanced chipmakers to prioritize U.S. customers over clients in China, passed the Senate as part of an earlier iteration of the NDAA, but was not included in the final version.

Outbound Investments

The COINS Act codified and expanded the Treasury’s new rules on outbound investment to restrict outbound investments in advanced semiconductors, AI systems, quantum computing, supercomputing, and hypersonic systems in countries of concern, including China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela.

The act also gives the U.S. president power to sanction foreign persons in these sectors who are linked or controlled by these regimes, to prohibit investment transactions with them, and to introduce penalty for violations of the law.

Separately, funding authorized by the NDAA cannot be used to knowingly support film, television, or other entertainment projects that have or may be censored at the behest of the Chinese communist regime to advance its interests.

Security and Supply Chains

The NDAA includes a revised version of the Biosecure Act, which requires the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to publish a list of “biotechnology companies of concern,” and bans federal agencies from procuring biotechnology equipment or services from these companies.
The legislation did not name any country. Earlier versions of the bill, which listed several Chinese biotech companies, failed to pass the legislation process either as a standalone bill or part of an omnibus bill.

A separate part of the NDAA requires the Director of National Intelligence to ensure that the intelligence community does not use a Chinese biotechnology supplier or its foreign subsidiaries to make products using synthetic DNA or RNA from domestic sources if the company is deemed to be a security or supply chain threat to the United States.

The law also required the Defense Department to create a Biotechnology Management Office.

The NDAA added molybdenum, gallium, and germanium to the list of sensitive materials. With some exceptions, the Department of Defense is prohibited from buying these materials from China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia, or selling the materials from the National Defense Stockpile to these countries.

It modified provisions in the 2021 NDAA that require the defense secretary to publish an annual list of Chinese military companies. The amendment specified that such companies may operate in or outside of China to prevent circumvention. While updating the list, the secretary will also be required to consider companies that have been sanctioned that year by other U.S. government departments.

The defense secretary is required to phase out Chinese computers and printers and to eliminate the reliance on optical glass and computer displays from countries including Belarus, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia by Jan. 1, 2030.

The Pentagon is banned from buying solar panels from China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

The department will also have to avoid sourcing seafood from these countries.

In 2023, an Outlaw Ocean Project investigation revealed the systemic practice of using forced labor on Chinese fishing vessels, a practice that is ongoing, according to more recent investigations. 

China Expertise, Taiwan, and Others

The NDAA authorized the State Department to expand its Regional China Officer (RCO) program to create at least 20 RCOs to monitor and report on the Chinese regime’s activities where the RCOs are posted, and to share their knowledge with their host countries and other U.S. allies.

The State Department is also authorized to create ambassadors-at-large for the Arctic and the Indian Ocean region and units to counter Chinese and Russian influence, as well as to establish an Inner Mongolia section within the U.S. Mission in China to monitor issues including human rights, developments in critical minerals mining, environmental degradation, and China’s space capabilities.

The NDAA mandated the declassification of intelligence related to the origins of COVID-19, including research conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the intention of Gain of Function research.

It also includes provisions related to Taiwan, such as joint maritime training programs.

Catherine Yang contributed to this report.
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