From Media Powerhouse to Financial Liability
Audience erosion has accelerated as viewers migrate online, and advertising revenue has followed. The result has been mounting losses for local broadcasters.
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In August 2024, Shenzhen Television shut down both its public affairs and entertainment channels, according to Chinese media reports. Reports on social media describe layoffs, chronic wage arrears, and salaries hovering near China’s minimum living standard. In Henan Province, some station employees earn about $500 a month, according to Chinese media reports. In Anhui, a television host shared a payslip showing take-home pay of less than $400.
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Former Guilin Television (China) reporter Zeng Jieming told The Epoch Times that his station failed to pay salaries for half of 2023, leading dozens of employees to stage protests. He said that only a small number of senior managers were fully funded by local government budgets. Most staff fall under semi-public employment structures, where pay depends heavily on station revenue.
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“When local finances tighten, TV stations are the first to lose funding,” Zeng said.
Fiscal Stress, Not Technology, Drives the Collapse
Zeng said the downturn in local television is driven less by technological disruption than by deepening fiscal stress.
Since 2018, he said, local governments have been squeezed by a combination of demographic decline, the collapse of the real estate sector that once underpinned public finances, and Beijing’s centralization of revenue. As budgets shrink, even essential services such as education and healthcare are being cut.
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In that environment, propaganda institutions long sustained by public funds are increasingly treated as nonessential.
“The death of local TV stations is fiscal, not technological,” Zeng said. “Once the money is gone, the system collapses.”
Why Television Fell Before Print
In many market economies, television outlasted newspapers. China’s media system, Zeng said, operates under a different logic.
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“[China’s] local TV stations are not market-driven enterprises,” he said.
“Instead, they function as administrative units and political tools, dependent on the regime’s funding and official advertising rather than audience demand.”
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Zeng said these propaganda machines are also expensive to run. Large staffing, layered bureaucracies, studios, transmission systems, and broadcast infrastructure create high fixed costs. By contrast, modern propaganda priorities favor low-cost, flexible, algorithm-driven platforms that can be edited, deleted, and redistributed instantly, and that shift has already happened.
The Regime Pivots
Young audiences—the demographic the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is most eager to influence—have largely abandoned television, Zeng said, gravitating instead toward short-video platforms, messaging apps, and online forums.
He said that in response, the regime has quietly pivoted. Rather than propping up local TV stations, propaganda resources are being redirected toward platform-based messaging, such as government-run social media accounts, coordinated influencer networks, and centrally managed online content systems.
“So the result is a striking irony,” Zeng said.
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“Local television stations continue producing programming for audiences that no longer exist. The role of television as a ‘local mouthpiece’ is over. It has been made obsolete by technology—and abandoned politically.”
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Chinese communist propaganda app "Xuexi Qiangguo," which literally translates as "Study to make China strong," on a mobile phone in front of its website on a computer, in this illustration picture taken on Feb. 18, 2019. Illustration/Tingshu Wang/Reuters
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Echoes of a Soviet Past
Zeng drew a historical parallel to the final years of the Soviet Union, when local television stations remained nominal propaganda organs but were largely ignored by the public. Salaries went unpaid, staff took private work on the side, and young professionals fled.
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“The rapid decline of [state] television is a sign that the CCP is approaching collapse,” he said.
In Zeng’s view, the rapid decline of state television reflects deeper stresses within China’s governance model. Whether those stresses will translate into broader political change remains uncertain, he said, but for China’s once-dominant local television stations, the collapse is already visible.
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Li Yuanming contributed to this report.
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