China's Oil Hoarding During Middle East War Sparks Sharp U.S. Rebuke

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"Unreliable Partner" — Bessent Calls Out Beijing

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent did not mince words on Tuesday, April 14. Speaking to reporters in Washington, he accused China of exploiting a global crisis for its own strategic gain — hoarding oil reserves during the Middle East war while restricting exports of critical goods to the rest of the world.

"They've shown themselves to be an unreliable partner," Bessent said, drawing a direct parallel to China's behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Beijing stockpiled protective medical equipment — including masks and gloves — at a time when the rest of the world was desperately short on supplies.

Bessent confirmed that he had already raised the issue directly with Chinese officials, signaling that Washington views this not merely as economic opportunism, but as a matter of strategic trust.

Beijing's Oil Stockpile: The Numbers Behind the Accusation

China's oil hoarding is not just rhetoric — the data backs it up. According to analysis by the Atlantic Council, China held the world's largest onshore crude stockpiles, estimated at around 1.2 billion barrels as of January 2026 — built up through purchases totaling approximately 100 million additional barrels over the previous year.

Reports as of January 2026 suggest China's reserves are sufficient to cover three to four months of domestic demand — a significant buffer that places Beijing in a far more comfortable position than its regional neighbors Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan, all of which face greater exposure to supply disruptions.

Bessent's Treasury Department has also noted that sanctioned Iranian oil is being purchased by China at heavily discounted prices — allowing Beijing to build its reserves cheaply while Iran's oil remains technically blocked from global markets by U.S. sanctions.

A Pattern of Self-Interest in Global Crises

Critics and analysts have pointed out that China's current behavior fits a broader pattern. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing was widely reported to have centralized global supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE) in the early weeks of the outbreak, creating severe shortages for other countries.

Now, with the Middle East war disrupting global energy markets and driving oil prices sharply higher, Beijing appears to be following a similar playbook — prioritizing national stockpiling over contributing to global supply stability.

Analysts describe China as a major economic player in the Middle East region, but not a meaningful security actor — a distinction that becomes increasingly uncomfortable for Beijing as pressure mounts on all sides to contribute to crisis resolution.

Beijing's official position on the war has focused on calls for diplomacy and de-escalation — a stance driven by its complex web of interests, including its strategic partnership with Iran, its close economic ties with Gulf states, and its ambition to present itself as a responsible global power. Critics argue, however, that stockpiling discounted oil during a global energy emergency tells a different story.

The Broader Pattern: Rare Earths, Export Restrictions, and Trust

The oil issue is not Beijing's only sore point with Washington. Over the past year, U.S. officials accused China of attempting a "global supply-chain power grab" through harsh restrictions on rare earth mineral exports — materials critical for smartphones, electric vehicles, batteries, and defense technologies.

Bessent warned that if China continues to position itself as an unreliable global partner, the world will have to consider decoupling from Chinese supply chains — a dramatic step that would reshape the global economy.

A fragile trade truce brokered in late 2025 temporarily eased tensions, but trust between Washington and Beijing remains thin. Bessent pointedly noted that when U.S. companies reported slowdowns in rare earth shipments, Chinese officials attributed the delays to a holiday — prompting Bessent to say flatly: "They can't be trusted."

Trump-Xi Summit Still on the Table — For Now

Despite the pointed criticism, Bessent struck a notably careful tone on the broader diplomatic relationship. He sidestepped questions about whether the oil dispute could derail President Trump's planned visit to Beijing at the end of April, saying that any rescheduling would be a logistical matter related to the ongoing war — not a political signal.

"I think the message for the visit is stability," Bessent said. "We've had great stability in the relationship since last summer; that emanates from the top down. Communication is the key."

Trump announced his intention to visit Beijing in April 2026 following a summit meeting with Xi Jinping in South Korea last October, where both sides agreed to extend a trade truce for one year. That diplomatic momentum now faces its first serious test.

What's at Stake

The Middle East conflict has exposed a fundamental tension at the heart of U.S.-China relations: both countries need stability, but they have deeply different ideas about what that means — and who should bear the costs.

Analysts warn that the crisis has exposed a hard truth about U.S. power — that decades of security guarantees did not prevent the disruption of one of the world's most critical energy chokepoints, and that Asian partners are now quietly asking harder questions about where their energy security actually comes from.

For Beijing, hoarding oil may look like prudent self-reliance. For Washington — and much of the world — it looks like a global partner choosing to benefit from a crisis rather than help solve it.

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Sources

1. Reuters — Bessent: China an "unreliable partner" on oil during Middle East war (April 14, 2026): https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-treasurys-bessent-says-china-has-been-unreliable-partner-by-hoarding-oil-2026-04-14/
2. Atlantic Council — What a Middle East oil and LNG crisis means for China and East Asia (March 5, 2026): https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-a-middle-east-oil-and-lng-crisis-means-for-china-and-east-asia/
3. The Soufan Center — How the War in the Middle East Could Impact U.S.-China Competition (March 18, 2026): https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-march-18/
4. U.S. House Select Committee on the CCP — "Crude Intentions": How China Became the Clearing Market for Sanctioned Oil: https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/crude-intentions_final.pdf
5. CNN — Desperate for fuel, US allies in Asia are turning to its adversaries (April 10, 2026): https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/10/world/us-asia-allies-energy-security-intl-hnk
6. NBC News — Trade standoff with China deepens as Bessent insists U.S. "will neither be commanded nor controlled" (October 15, 2025): https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/trump-trade-china-bessent-rare-earth-rcna237786
7. Council on Foreign Relations — The U.S.-China Trade Relationship (updated April 2026): https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship

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