Behind the Stalemate of the CCP’s Fourth Plenum
Udumbara
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On Oct. 23, the communiqué from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) Fourth Plenum dispelled many rumors, likely leaving observers disappointed. What some expected to be a decisive showdown within the Party instead ended in a stalemate.
Xi Jinping retained all his titles but failed to promote loyalists to fill vacant seats. The Politburo shrank to 23 members with no replacements. The Central Military Commission (CMC) lost three members and did not appoint replacements. Zhang Shengmin’s promotion to CMC vice-chair was an insignificant adjustment at best. Figures from the Communist Youth League faction, such as Hu Chunhua and Wang Yang, did not return to the political center. Beijing’s “stalemate” now looks more like a deadlock.
On the first day of the plenum, rumors circulated that Xi Jinping would remain as CCP General Secretary but relinquish his role as chairman of the Central Military Commission, to be succeeded by CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, who would also be elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee.
None of that materialized, apparently because Party elders and senior officials were unwilling to expose internal divisions. Zhang himself was likely reluctant to appear prematurely as the most powerful figure in the CCP, especially in the absence of any formal acknowledgment of Xi’s missteps or a clear plan for an orderly transition.
Rumors of a comeback by Youth League figures fizzled out, leaving lingering questions. Perhaps their faction lacked the strength to gain support from Central Committee members, or possibly Party elders feared that a full showdown would lead to greater political turmoil. Another possibility is that no one wanted to step into the political mess that Xi Jinping left behind, which seemed impossible to clean up. This includes heightened risks of internal struggles resulting from continuous purges, as well as prolonged economic stagnation, which has led to rising unemployment and a massive withdrawal of foreign capital.
Nevertheless, the plenum confirmed the military’s disciplinary decisions, which were announced prior to the four-day event. Over a year earlier, the Third Plenum endorsed the Politburo’s decision to expel former Defense Minister Li Shangfu and former Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao from the Party. This time, the Fourth Plenum formally approved the expulsion of He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others.
However, following the Sept. 28 Politburo meeting, Chinese state media Xinhua News Agency did not report the ousting of the nine generals. Instead, on Oct. 17, the Ministry of National Defense—not the Party’s central leadership—announced the results. State media outlets only reprinted the announcement, which was highly unusual.
‘United’ Image Is Only Superficial
Xi Jinping emerged from the plenum with all his titles intact, seemingly having survived another major test. But his political camp, battered by recent purges, has not recovered, and his loyalists failed to fill key vacancies.Across China’s military branches and theater commands, top posts remain unfilled. Although Xi is still head of the Central Military Commission, he appears to have lost control over the military, unable to promote loyalists to the CMC or even approve new generals.
There were more signs indicating that the Fourth Plenum was far from the “calm and united” image portrayed in its communiqué.
Only 168 Central Committee members attended the Fourth Plenum—31 fewer than at the previous session, meaning 18.5 percent were absent. Fourteen members, including He Weidong, have already been purged. Others either refused to join what they saw as a meaningless political performance or were unable to attend for other reasons.
What Lies Ahead
The plenum’s communiqué was filled with formulaic rhetoric that sought to conceal internal strife. However, the defense ministry’s early announcement of the punishment of nine generals had already shattered that façade. Although no reshuffle of the top leadership occurred, the Politburo remains at 23 members, and the CMC has dwindled to four out of seven—an awkward, half-empty structure.The Party chief’s position remains unchanged, but a successor has yet to emerge. The Youth League faction failed to return to the Politburo or Central Committee’s inner circle—perhaps lacking support, or simply waiting for a better moment to make a comeback.
The CCP is promoting its upcoming “15th Five-Year Plan,” yet under the current leadership, the previous two plans have already faltered. The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and its disastrous lockdowns derailed the “13th Five-Year Plan,” while the “14th Five-Year Plan” has remained largely on paper as China’s economy struggles.
Regardless of who holds power—or who might replace Xi Jinping—no one seems capable of cleaning up the current mess. This may be the real reason the stalemate at the plenum remains unbroken.
The plenum’s deadlock could spark a deeper crisis. It is widely known that Xi’s health is in decline, yet no successor has been named. What happens if he suddenly falls ill again—or worse?
One plausible explanation is that Xi has lost real power and decisions are now being made collectively by an expanded Politburo led by a different figure. Furthermore, the Party leadership may have realized that even a change of personnel cannot solve China’s deep internal and external crises.
If so, the stalemate at the plenum shows that the CCP has exhausted all options and is trapped with no way forward. The lack of change at this stage simply reflects an attempt to maintain stability.
China has only one real way out: dismantle the CCP, return power and wealth to the people, and let ordinary citizens—rather than unqualified Party officials—use their own intelligence to shape the country’s future.
But the CCP refuses to give up its privileges or loosen its grip on power. That is why the Fourth Plenum fell into this stalemate—a deadlock that might ultimately be irreversible.
