Taiwan Back in the Spotlight of Trump–Xi Talks—What’s Behind It?

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The first two topics were anticipated, but this time, the highlight was Taiwan.

Usually, every meeting between U.S. and Chinese leaders touches on Taiwan. But judging from official readouts, neither Trump nor Xi mentioned Taiwan during their Sept. 19 call or their Oct. 30 meeting in Busan. Many observers interpret this silence as a sign of underlying strategic maneuvering.

In reality, the two sides have already said everything there is to say on Taiwan over the years. Now, in many cases, they act without talking, and when they do speak about the contentious issue, their words are mostly for show.

Of course, Trump’s Taiwan policy demonstrated a mix of tightening and easing measures.​ On the one hand, earlier this year, he delayed the approval of a $400 million military aid package for Taiwan, canceled a planned meeting of defense ministers, and asked the Taiwanese president to avoid a transit stop in New York.

On the other hand, in mid-November, his administration announced two arms sales, including a $330 million package and nearly $700 million in advanced surface-to-air missiles.

These moves effectively debunked claims that Trump was “selling out” Taiwan to Xi.

So why did the Taiwan issue return to the Trump–Xi call this time?

The immediate trigger was the sharp clash between China and Japan over what Tokyo calls a Taiwan contingency.

On Nov. 7, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said during a House of Representatives Budget Committee session in the Diet that if a Taiwan contingency involved the use of force, it could constitute a “survival-threatening situation,” allowing Japan to exercise collective self-defense. This was an answer grounded in Japan’s domestic law.

However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized on her remarks, significantly worsening the situation and causing a rapid decline in China–Japan relations. Within China, the authorities launched a new wave of anti-Japanese propaganda and reinstated restrictions on Japanese seafood imports—restrictions originally imposed after the 2013 Fukushima disaster and renewed in 2023 following Japan’s release of treated wastewater. Beijing also urged Chinese tourists to cancel their trips to Japan and abruptly canceled performances by Japanese musicians in China. The authorities may also tighten controls on rare-earth exports to Japan.

The CCP also launched a major diplomatic offensive in an attempt to rally international support. China’s United Nations ambassador Fu Cong sent a formal letter to U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, warning that China would “resolutely defend itself” if Japan intervened militarily in the Taiwan Strait. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi toured three Central Asian states—Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—he secured their support for Beijing, accusing Japan of crossing the CCP’s “red lines” by signaling possible military involvement in Taiwan.

Meanwhile, Beijing refused to engage in rational dialogue with Tokyo and behaved in a very coarse, discourteous manner. A Chinese diplomat in Japan even issued “decapitation” threats in response to Takaichi’s remarks. China announced that it would not hold a meeting with Japan at the G20 summit in Johannesburg and canceled a trilateral culture ministers’ meeting with Japan and South Korea that had been scheduled for November.

Tokyo, however, did not budge. Takaichi refused to retract her remarks. Japanese officials stressed that she was simply responding to a hypothetical question and that Tokyo’s stance had not changed. They dismissed China’s claims of a “policy shift” as baseless and reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to dialogue, rejecting Beijing’s coercion. Clearly, Japan does not want to escalate the dispute, but it will not surrender to pressure.

After more than two weeks of this dispute, the CCP gained little and, in fact, found itself in a more passive and awkward position. So when Trump and Xi spoke by phone, Beijing tried to enlist the United States to put pressure on Japan.

According to Chinese state-run media Xinhua, during their phone conversation, Xi played the “history card” by emphasizing that Taiwan’s return to China is an important component of the post-World War II international order, and that the United States and China had once fought fascism and militarism together—implying that they should now jointly defend the outcomes of the war. The Xinhua readout also claimed that Trump acknowledged China’s important role in the victory of World War II and said the U.S. government understands how important Taiwan is to China.

However, Trump’s Truth Social post about the call did not mention any of this. And even if, for the sake of argument, Trump did say that the United States recognizes how vital the Taiwan issue is to China, that would not mean Washington supports Beijing’s current approach to Japan. It’s important to remember that the United States and Japan are now close allies, while relations with Beijing are in a state of intense strategic competition.

The Trump administration is fully aware of Taiwan’s strategic importance and the seriousness of a potential Chinese use of force, and approaches the issue with caution.

Taiwan’s reemergence in the Trump–Xi call shows Beijing trying to drive a wedge between Washington and Tokyo after its confrontation with Japan backfired, while also trying to indirectly constrain the United States. But Washington refused to play along with the CCP’s “history card.”

The American Institute in Taiwan—the United States’ de facto embassy in Taipei—said in September that Beijing was distorting the Cairo Declaration and other World War II-era documents to pressure Taiwan, noting that none of these documents settled Taiwan’s ultimate political status. That statement likely reflects the Trump administration’s current stance.

Overall, the CCP’s move to highlight Taiwan during the Trump–Xi call was likely a pointless effort.