New US Unit in Philippines Vital for Taiwan, South China Sea Defense: Analysts

New US Unit in Philippines Vital for Taiwan, South China Sea Defense: Analysts

.

The U.S. Army’s new contingent in the Philippines could play a critical role in countering Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, but poses some risk to Philippine forces, experts say.

The mission profile of the unit—formally identified as Army Rotational Force–Philippines—was outlined to the Marine Rotational Force–Southeast Asia in mid-January in Manila, according to a Jan. 29 post by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS).

The unit had remained unannounced prior to the release, marking the first official acknowledgment of the deployment.

The move aligns with escalating regional security concerns, illustrated by the Philippine Navy’s detection of 447 Chinese naval and coast guard vessels in the South China Sea last year, a sharp rise from the 278 recorded in 2024.

Similar pressure is mounting near Taiwan, where data from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense showed 3,764 Chinese military aircraft incursions in 2025—a 22.4 percent increase that underscores the intensifying “gray-zone” operations threatening Indo-Pacific stability.

Gray-zone operations are aggressive and coercive actions that are designed to intimidate an opponent yet remain below the threshold of warfare.

Countering Gray Warfare

Justin Baquisal, a national security analyst at FACTS Asia, said the force represents the long-term vision of gradually returning significant American “boots on the ground” to the Philippines, signaling that the U.S. and Philippine militaries are providing warfighting capability.

“It’s supposed to provide strategic deterrence, as China would hesitate to harm U.S. troops since it’s still interested in avoiding a direct superpower confrontation,” Baquisal told The Epoch Times.

He added that the force creates a foundation for scaling up their defense cooperation—including joint patrols, infrastructure development, and intelligence sharing—to push back against Chinese aggression.

“This is not directed at the South China Sea per se, but toward checking China’s ambitions more generally,” Baquisal said.

Vincent Kyle Parada, a lecturer at De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde in Manila, said rotational deployments could enhance allied interoperability and maintain the readiness needed to respond effectively to regional challenges.

“They can increase the cost of hostile action enough to alter Beijing’s strategic calculus. Washington and Manila might also be looking at these rotational deployments as a kind of tripwire force against China,” Parada told The Epoch Times.

Parada said that such a battalion-sized contingent allows allies to signal the United States’ commitment to the Philippines “without necessarily escalating tensions.”

“At the same time, they carry with them an underlying threat that greater force can and will be made to bear from the U.S. mainland in the event of armed conflict,” Parada said.

Defending Taiwan

Hunter Marston, an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, said the force could prove relevant should China move against Taiwan—a self-governed democracy that has never been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which has vowed to annex the island by force if necessary.

“The United States has an abiding interest in the security and defense of Taiwan. Therefore, the rotational forces would almost certainly play an advisory role and help to coordinate and mobilize combined allied forces, given the proximity and logistical support capabilities of U.S. troops in the Philippines,” Marston told The Epoch Times.

Baquisal said China’s decision to attack Taiwan depends partly on the defense capabilities of Taiwan’s neighbors, such as Japan and the Philippines, noting that the new force establishes a necessary deterrent in the southern First Island Chain to fill a strategic void.

“This force lays the groundwork for the U.S. to close that gap, and overall increase the ability of the U.S. to project strength from areas near Taiwan,” Baquisal said.

Parada said that, given recent U.S.-Philippine military exercises showcasing systems such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and the midrange Typhon missile system, he expected the rotational forces to operate primarily as mobile units equipped with anti-ship munitions in a conflict scenario.

“U.S. forces would be concentrated along the country’s northern provinces, including the Batanes Islands, in order to deny China access to the Luzon Strait and Bashi Channel and maintain a maritime corridor between Taiwan and the Philippines,” he said.

Risk to Manila

Amid enhanced U.S.-Philippine coordination, Baquisal said Beijing will likely persist with its established playbook of coercive pressure.

“Beijing is keen to punish Manila for its increasing cooperation with the U.S., so there are risks that China may use economic sanctions,” Baquisal said.

However, Beijing is unlikely to take such drastic steps in the near term, given its current internal challenges, he added.

“The domestic situation in China is also important to consider, as it is beset right now with purges in the People’s Liberation Army, and domestic economic issues,” Baquisal said.

But Marston warned that Beijing’s coercion could turn lethal for Philippine forces.

“[It’s] to signal its growing displeasure with deeper U.S.-Philippines allied integration as well as coordination in both the South China Sea and Taiwan contingencies,” he said.

“The probability that China’s escalating coercion will lead to the injury or death of Philippine Coast Guard personnel is steadily growing.”

.