Is Chinese Diplomacy Ever Sincere?

Is Chinese Diplomacy Ever Sincere?

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Commentary

U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping reached a framework agreement for U.S.–China trade relations at a meeting in Busan, South Korea, in late October. This “one-year trade deal” amounts to a temporary truce that suspends several retaliatory measures by the two nations while committing both sides to ongoing talks.

The United States and China implemented a one-year reciprocal de-escalation in which the United States halved its fentanyl-related tariffs to 10 percent and suspended new affiliate-entity controls and maritime fees. China rolled back rare-earth and critical mineral export restrictions, removed nontariff barriers on U.S. companies, and committed to large-scale soybean and agricultural purchases in exchange for stabilized market access.

During the buildup to that meeting and consistent with Chinese negotiating strategy, several Chinese analysts—including Zhou Mi, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation; Huang Rengang, vice-chairman of the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies; and Wang Wei, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of American Studies in Beijing—publicly urged the United States to show “greater sincerity in engaging with Beijing” to reduce mistrust and deescalate tensions.

Let us examine whether the Chinese communist regime’s sincerity in negotiations and diplomacy is generally consistent with a common understanding of the concept.

The Strategy of Chinese Diplomacy

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) diplomacy is orchestrated from Zhongnanhai as part of a pragmatic, sovereignty-centric strategy to negotiate international agreements that prioritize Beijing’s interests above all else.

The CCP actively pursues treaties, pacts, and other agreements that give it economic, technological, and diplomatic advantages in pursuit of long-term goals and objectives. The strategy involves securing short-term gains and sending diplomatic signals to other nations.

An example of a short-term gain was joining the 2015 Paris Agreement, which, over time, has led to China dominating the recently completed COP30 in Belém, Brazil. An example of diplomatic signaling was Beijing’s recent commitment to 2035 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for emissions cuts, which telegraphed China’s “reliability over time” to its “Global South” allies.

A third aspect of CCP diplomatic strategy is the omnipresent psychological warfare practiced throughout all negotiations, aimed at enhancing Chinese global influence while portraying Beijing as a “responsible power” worthy of leading the world.

However, Chinese compliance with agreements reached is highly selective and conditional, with frequent reinterpretations or violations made when their obligations conflict with core national interests such as territorial claims, economic protectionism, or—and most importantly—regime stability. This continual lawfare approach embedded in all CCP diplomacy could be termed “international law with Chinese characteristics.”

In short, CCP diplomatic strategy coupled with lawfare allows Beijing to exploit ambiguities, build parallel institutions that can replace international institutions in a future “Chinese new world order,” and counter Western dominance within existing international institutions. Chinese diplomats probably frame this as fulfilling commitments responsibly while resisting “hegemonic” pressures (“hegemonic” being a favorite word when referring to their main enemy, the United States).

Strategic Noncompliance

Beijing views all treaties as voluntary and not binding if they infringe on “core interests,” such as Uyghur pacification or the absorption of Taiwan. Many agreements reached with other countries are focused on countering perceived U.S. containment policies, including tariffs, alliances, and the use of international law; for example, in the South China Sea.
Over the decades, Beijing has exhibited a pattern of strategic noncompliance with agreements, large and small, that erodes trust and prompts countermeasures such as sanctions and tariffs. The pattern involves China often adhering initially to a given agreement or treaty for goodwill purposes, followed by erosion over time of the agreed-upon provisions. A few examples are provided below.

Exploitation of Loopholes and Asymmetries

This involves leveraging and stretching language ambiguities—such as “developing nation status”—to skirt outright violations. An example was the Chinese export of nuclear technology to Pakistan and Iran despite the 1985 U.S.–China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement that precluded such behavior. Beijing rationalized that its status as a developing nation freed it from its obligations.

Use of Retaliatory or Conditional Breaches

The regime frequently ties its compliance to that of its partner(s) as specified in agreements. If a partner creates what Beijing deems a “dispute,” China reserves the right to suspend compliance or withdraw from the agreement. An example was China’s backtracking on the “Phase One” trade agreement during the first Trump administration, after the U.S. imposed tariffs.

Bait and Switch

This involves making a big public splash by agreeing to a major international treaty, only to use domestic Chinese laws and/or Chinese strategic imperatives to reinterpret and water down key provisions and constraints on Chinese behavior. An example was China meeting the various assurances stemming from the resolution of the South China Sea disputes in 2016, but then it began a campaign to militarize the disputed islands.

Outright Noncompliance

There are many other examples of China’s failure to uphold its commitments under treaties and agreements. A few of the more prominent ones are listed below.

The 2024 US Section 301 Investigation (Ongoing)

This probe was initiated by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) on Oct. 24 to determine whether China has denied U.S. rights or benefits under the Phase One Economic and Trade Agreement (signed on Jan. 15, 2020), or if Chinese acts, policies, or practices violate or are inconsistent with the agreement’s provisions.
Specifically, official U.S. export data revealed significant Chinese shortfalls. China had committed to purchasing over $535 billion in U.S. goods and services for 2020 and 2021 but fell short by more than $217 billion in aggregate, with deficiencies across nearly all negotiated categories, including manufactured goods, energy, agriculture, and services.

The January 2025 USTR Report

Based on its original World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments in 2001 and reaffirmed in U.S.–China bilateral trade talks during the first Trump presidency, this report concluded that China’s state-backed subsidies, overbuilding of maritime capacity, and coercive mercantilist tactics had flooded global markets with cheap Chinese ships and services, harming U.S. companies.

Hong Kong Autonomy Assurances (Ongoing)

The CCP imposed a national security law on Hong Kong in 2020, bypassing Hong Kong’s local legislature and criminalizing dissent, which the United States determined was a direct violation of the 1992 U.S.–Hong Kong Policy Act.
The new law also violated the 1984 Sino–British Joint Declaration, which committed Beijing to preserving Hong Kong’s autonomy, including an independent judiciary, free speech, and separate trade status from mainland China, for 50 years after the 1997 handover.

WTO Accession Protocol Commitments (Ongoing)

Under the protocols agreed to in 2001, China agreed to reduce tariffs, eliminate export subsidies, protect intellectual property (IP), and treat foreign companies equally. Since 2001, the United States has filed more than 20 WTO complaints against China for violations, such as unreported subsidies to state-owned enterprises and discriminatory IP enforcement.

Concluding Thoughts

Communist China executes its diplomatic strategy according to a carefully crafted game plan to achieve Beijing’s interests and goals through treaty negotiations. The provisions of treaties and agreements are then cavalierly disregarded if the CCP arbitrarily determines that they infringe on China’s core interests. Examples of Chinese violations are replete, to the point of causing considerable perplexity among some observers.

What is the point of “showing greater sincerity” in negotiating with China, as the Chinese apparatchiks requested above, when Chinese treaty noncompliance is the rule, not the exception? Can any Chinese diplomat be believed, and will the CCP actually adhere to agreed-upon treaty provisions over the long haul? The answer appears to be, “only insofar as China benefits.” And that could change from the moment the ink is dry.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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