China Builds Missiles and Trains for War While Talking Peace With India
Udumbara
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While Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi appear to be making progress toward a border solution, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is intensifying high-altitude mountain combat training and expanding its nuclear-capable Rocket Force infrastructure across the Tibetan Plateau, preparing for potential war with India while complicating U.S. defense of Taiwan.
In late October, senior military commanders from both sides held border management talks at the Moldo–Chushul meeting point on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh. The area is one of the most sensitive and heavily militarized stretches of the frontier, where control of mountain passes provides a critical tactical advantage. Several confrontations, including the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, occurred nearby.
China’s defense ministry described the talks as “active and in-depth,” focused on managing the western sector of the LAC. The meeting followed the first direct passenger flight in five years between Kolkata and Guangzhou, which Chinese officials hailed as a sign of improving ties. India’s foreign ministry said the revival of commercial and diplomatic activity reflected a “growing trend toward normalization.”
China has been placing army veterans as military instructors in Tibetan schools to train children as young as 6, explicitly to cultivate soldiers from Tibet, given Tibetans’ natural and habitual adjustment to high-altitude climates. The PLA views Tibetans as an important asset for the military when conducting mountain warfare against adversaries.
These developments reflect the Chinese regime’s broader preparations for mountain warfare, as remote launch sites would provide rear support and escalation options in any future conflict with India. The sites’ elevation and road access give China faster deployment and resupply capabilities across the plateau, reducing warning time and complicating surveillance. For New Delhi, the expansion highlights a widening missile gap across the Himalayas and an increasing challenge to maintain deterrence parity as the PLA entrenches its high-altitude network.
Through major reforms in 2015 and 2024, the PLA developed new capabilities in cyberwarfare, space operations, electronic warfare, and network-centric command. These advances allow China to target India’s command centers, logistics, and communications, potentially enabling swift victory on its own terms. Sawhney concludes that while Beijing is shaping the future of high-technology and information-driven warfare, India remains bound by outdated paradigms and symbolic gestures rather than addressing the structural and technological challenges of modern combat.
The threat extends beyond India to the United States and Taiwan, as analysts say these factories produce missiles central to China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, designed to keep U.S. naval forces at bay during a Taiwan conflict. Weapons such as the DF-26 and DF-27 intermediate-range missiles could strike U.S. and allied bases across the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Strategically, the Golmud expansion strengthens China’s second-strike and long-range deterrence posture while increasing its ability to pressure both India and U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific.
Experts warn that the expansion carries serious implications: from Golmud, the PLA can target Indian bases, U.S. assets, and Indian Ocean nodes, giving Beijing greater flexibility for deterrence and escalation. Because DF-26 missiles are dual-capable, they blur the line between conventional and nuclear use, heightening crisis risks along the China–India border and in Taiwan-related conflicts.
Overall, the Golmud base underscores the Chinese regime’s push to fortify its western deterrent posture, extend missile reach, and sustain high-altitude operations. These developments will shape defense planning in India, Taiwan, and the United States.
