China’s Aggressive Rhetoric Against Japan Doesn’t Align With Its Actual Military Strength
China’s Aggressive Rhetoric Against Japan Doesn’t Align With Its Actual Military Strength - Part two: Chinese authorities may fear that an actual conflict could expose serious weaknesses in the military.
Udumbara
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Potential Air Warfare in the East China Sea
Although the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) rhetoric toward Japan has grown more pointed, the underlying balance of power makes an actual clash unlikely. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) capabilities and internal problems explain why.If a conflict began in the East China Sea, the opening stage would be an air battle. China’s J-20s would face Japan’s F-35s, with both sides relying on early detection and long-range engagement.
On paper, China holds the advantage in fifth-generation aircraft numbers. In practice, however, Japan and the United States have a better integrated network of sensors, early-warning planes, refueling tankers, and electronic warfare systems.
The side that detects threats first, communicates effectively, and remains airborne longest will have the upper hand. Japan—with U.S. support—has the edge in all these areas.
China’s J-20 has limitations. Its stealth profile is weaker from the sides and rear. It lacks a cannon for close combat and cannot carry long-range anti-ship missiles internally. This restricts its role in maritime operations.
China’s second-best aircraft, the J-16 and the Su-30, can carry anti-ship weapons; however, their missiles are outdated and have demonstrated inconsistent performance. In contrast, Japan’s F-2 can fire the ASM-3, a fast, long-range anti-ship missile specifically built to defeat modern air-defense systems.
Even if China kept enough aircraft over the East China Sea to contest airspace, its ability to strike Japan’s ships would still fall short.
Beijing Flaunts Missiles, But Confidence Is Lacking
China’s long-range bomber force adds another layer, but one with real limits.The H-6 bomber can carry the air-launched YJ-21, a missile Beijing highlights in propaganda videos. But the recent purge of the Rocket Force and reports of quality-control failures across China’s missile programs have cast doubt on the reliability of some of its most promoted systems.
Beijing’s decision to showcase a broad mix of new anti-ship missiles may reflect uncertainty more than strength.
In September, it displayed a long list of new anti-ship missiles—YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-19, YJ-20—while quietly shifting attention away from older systems modeled after Russian designs.
Introducing many new models at once is not a sign of confidence—it indicates that the PLA is unsure which systems actually work.
If China were to deploy all of these so-called new anti-ship missiles against Japan—or even launch some Dongfeng-26 missiles at the Japanese mainland—their actual performance would quickly be exposed. If most of these missiles were intercepted, much like Iran’s attacks on Israel, China’s supposed “ace weapons” would lose all credibility.
Moreover, if China launched missiles at Japan, it would face mature defenses.
Japan fields around 30 Patriot PAC-3 units, and its Aegis destroyers carry Standard Missile-3 and Standard Missile-6 interceptors—systems proven in combat. Japan’s defense industry is capable enough that Tokyo recently delivered domestically produced PAC-3 interceptors to the United States.
China’s missiles, by contrast, remain untested in real conditions.
PLA Cannot Risk Provoking the US–Japan Alliance
And that is the central point. Any attack on Japan would activate the U.S.–Japan alliance.The United States would provide satellite intelligence, electronic warfare support, targeting data, and missile-defense reinforcement. It could jam China’s Beidou navigation system, disrupting precision strikes.
If China attacked U.S. bases in Japan, Washington would be fully justified in striking back, potentially far beyond the East China Sea. The CCP knows this.
Moreover, the CCP’s military has been shaken by corruption and internal turmoil. Dozens of generals have been removed. Procurement scandals and poor-quality equipment have raised doubts about the reliability of key systems. Even China’s own military newspapers now stress the need to tolerate “exploratory failures” and admit that critical technologies “cannot be bought or borrowed.” These are candid statements for a system that usually hides weaknesses.
In this context, Beijing’s claim that it would deliver a “head-on blow” to Japan sounds more like a warning rather than preparation.
CCP officials are under pressure at home and abroad, and displays of military strength—however exaggerated—serve to rally domestic support.
Today, the corruption now entrenched in the Chinese military far exceeds anything seen in the Qing Dynasty era. Should the CCP launch a war, it risks an even more disastrous outcome, including commanders fleeing the battlefield and soldiers defecting.
In short, an actual conflict that could expose the PLA’s vulnerabilities and invite U.S. intervention is unlikely to be something the CCP would choose.
