Beijing Uses Security Dialogue as Cover for Indo-Pacific Expansion: Analysts

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The United States is countering the Chinese Communist Party’s deceptive actions in the Indo-Pacific by accelerating the integration of regional allies into a collective deterrence network, experts say.

“Washington’s position is straightforward: when military aircraft and vessels come into contact, maintain safe distances and avoid provocations,” Su told The Epoch Times. “But China deliberately inflates this basic safety issue into questions about freedom of navigation, twisting international law definitions.”

Su characterized the dialogue as a calculated smokescreen to project a facade of peace, predicting that the repeated dangerous intercepts, flare firings, and blocking maneuvers carried out by the CCP’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against other vessels in the region are likely to persist regardless of the diplomatic optics.

“Beijing still intends to conduct aggressive military activities in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait to prevent other nations’ vessels from entering, demonstrating its jurisdiction to support sovereignty claims, particularly against Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian military aircraft and ships, which the PLA has repeatedly intercepted in dangerous and unprofessional ways,” Su said.

Echoing Su’s assessment, Lin Ting-hui, former deputy secretary-general at the Taiwanese Society of International Law, noted that while the resumption of talks is significant after Beijing unilaterally froze the dialogue following then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, China is primarily exploiting the platform to project an illusory image of co-managing the Pacific, and inadvertently exposing the regime’s strategic limitations.

Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi answers questions from reporters about her telephone talks with U.S. President Donald Trump at the Prime Minister's Office in Tokyo on Nov. 25, 2025. JIJI Press/AFP via Getty Images

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“True combat readiness requires deep-ocean logistics, yet the Fujian operates only in near-seas contexts. Furthermore, if China truly intended to pressure Japan, it would have deployed forces to the East China Sea or the eastern Sea of Japan,” Lin said.

Lin predicted PLA exercises would likely remain restrained due to fragile internal command structures and the political imperative to preserve Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s standing.

“China’s internal military control is currently unstable, and with Beijing hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 2026, overly aggressive military activities could trigger international sanctions,” Lin stated. “Therefore, maintaining a more stable approach in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea likely aligns better with China’s national interests for now.”

Su said that Beijing’s intimidation tactics against Japan have backfired, given the Takaichi administration’s 72 percent approval rating, interpreting the relative calm in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea as a brief year-end hiatus before the PLA likely ramps up a series of intensified drills next year.

“China may have temporarily paused formal drills in the South China Sea, but it continues to employ close-in reconnaissance against U.S. vessels there,” Su said.

“Next year could see a series of maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea, with the Fujian serving as a benchmark for overseas military display. In the event of war, it could operate in distant waters—the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, or east of Taiwan—to sever the island’s supply chains.”

US Indo-Pacific Strategies

Addressing the persistent threat of gray-zone tactics, non-military provocative actions below the threshold of war, Lin observed that the United States is monitoring activity across the Indo-Pacific with growing urgency, viewing incidents such as continued harassment or attacks on the Philippines as a trigger to reaffirm the full scope of its defense pact with Manila, a strategic signal designed to establish clear red lines for Beijing.

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A Chinese Navy helicopter flies close to a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources plane above Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea on February 18, 2025. Ezra Acayan/Getty Images

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“As 2026 marks the tenth anniversary of the 2016 South China Sea arbitration, the Philippines is likely to take steps that reinforce its maritime rights, and the U.S. will continue supporting Philippine interests at sea, while China is unlikely to risk actions that could trigger the mutual defense treaty [between the United States and the Philippines],” Lin said.

Su anticipated that the Trump administration’s soon-to-be-released national security strategy is likely to show Beijing as a paramount threat, prompting Washington to accelerate the operational integration of its alliance network and encourage regional partners to assume a more active role in maritime security.

“In the past two or three years, the number of U.S. warships transiting the Taiwan Strait has decreased while the number of participating countries has grown, effectively pulling more allies into the Indo-Pacific to contain Beijing and build a broader collective deterrent,” Su said.

“While Washington may ease certain economic measures, its military posture will tighten through plans to deploy air-defense systems in northern Luzon, provide Japan with long-range Tomahawk missiles, and expand joint exercises with Taiwan to strengthen the defensive capabilities of Indo-Pacific allies.”

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