China, Russia, and India Project Unity at SCO Summit—But Fault Lines Remain

The image of friendship and solidarity between China, Russia, and India was one of the defining moments of the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, held from Aug. 31 to Sept. 1 in the northern Chinese port city of Tianjin.

However, analysts believe that India will likely align more closely with the West over time; it simply needs space to manage the transition. Furthermore, according to one expert, once the war in Ukraine ends or significantly de-escalates, Russia may rebalance its foreign policy by moving away from its exclusive dependence on China and toward broader multilateral engagement.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping used the summit as a stage to assert China’s leadership ambitions, urging SCO member states to “oppose the Cold War mentality, and block confrontation and acts of bullying.” According to Chinese state media Xinhua, Xi positioned the SCO as a champion of “true multilateralism,” implicitly contrasting it with the current Western-led global order.

Xi also announced billions in aid and infrastructure investment and emphasized that “the future of the world should be decided by all countries together.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin echoed these sentiments, hailing the SCO as a platform for “genuine multilateralism” and blaming NATO expansion and a Western-backed coup in Ukraine as the root causes of the ongoing conflict. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while appearing friendly and even walking hand-in-hand with Putin into the summit venue, expressed hope for an end to the war and reaffirmed India’s strategic partnership with Russia. In this apparent anti-U.S., anti-West context, the show of camaraderie among the three leaders has understandably raised concerns among the Western democracies.

“Since the end of the Cold War, India’s core foreign policy doctrine has shifted from nonalignment to strategic autonomy,” he told The Epoch Times. This approach enables New Delhi to maneuver among major powers and international groupings, maximizing national interests while maintaining flexibility.

“In short, if you want to understand India’s foreign policy, consider this logic: it tends to lean toward whichever country or partnership offers the greatest benefit at a given time, but it never fully commits to one side,” Shen explained.

“Eleven of the world’s top 15 nations in terms of GDP belong to the U.S.-led democracy bloc. China and Russia clearly belong to the anti-Western bloc. As of now, India and Brazil are the only two that have not decided which side to take,” he said.

In his view, India’s eventual alignment with the democracies is all but inevitable.

Lan further pointed out that India’s close relationship with Russia dates back to the Soviet era.

“India and Russia have been bound by a web of intertwined interests ever since, including deep industrial ties and personal connections among influential business families,” he said.

Regarding China-India relations, Lan said that India is unlikely to immediately sever ties with communist China, in part due to historical factors—notably, the fact that a significant portion of India’s supply chains still run through China. This dependency makes sudden decoupling economically risky and could threaten Modi’s bid for a third term and the political future of his party.

Lan also pointed out that the United States played a role in shaping this situation.

“For nearly five decades, Washington pursued a pro-China policy. It was only in 2018 that this began to change when President Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese-made solar panels. That was the first real step away from a global trade system centered around China.”

Just as it will take time for the United States to unwind from China-centered globalization, Lan suggested that India also needs time to complete its strategic pivot. Still, the trajectory is clear.

“The partnership between India and the United States—as seen in Biden and Modi’s pledge to cooperate ‘from seas to stars’—is something India does not want to lose,” Lan said. During Modi’s state visit to the United States in June 2023, the two leaders used the phrase to highlight their commitment to expanding collaboration across maritime security, space exploration, technology, and investment.

Retired Navy Capt. Carl Schuster, who served as a director of operations at the U.S. Navy Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center, shared a similar perspective on India-China relations.

“This partnership isn’t solid,” Schuster told The Epoch Times. “India’s engagement with China and Russia is largely a response to U.S. pressure. If we ease that pressure and deepen our cooperation with India, it will, in turn, scale back its ties with China.”

Lan added that international media have been overly critical of India’s display of unity at the SCO.

“It takes time for the country to resolve complex issues,” he said. “It’s also not surprising that India is frustrated by the U.S. tariffs imposed over its purchase of Russian oil, especially when European countries continue to buy Russian energy as well. India simply wants to be treated fairly.”

In June 2020, soldiers from both sides fought with improvised weapons in the Galwan Valley, resulting in at least 20 Indian fatalities—the deadliest clash between the two countries in decades. Though subsequent negotiations have led to troop withdrawals from some areas and reduced immediate tensions, the risk of renewed confrontation remains.

“If another conflict breaks out, Russia may choose to remain neutral rather than side with India,” Shen said. “In that case, it would be countries like the United States, Japan, or Australia that would be more likely to intervene or offer support.”

Commentator Hui Huyu similarly said that the tensions between China and India far outweigh their shared interests—ranging from unresolved border disputes and competition over the Yarlung Tsangpo River’s water resources, to Beijing’s longstanding support for Pakistan, India’s arch-rival. These factors make it unlikely for India to draw closer to the Chinese Communist Party.

Sun Kuo-hsiang, a professor of international affairs and business at Nanhua University in Taiwan, believes that Russia’s long-term foreign policy could shift after the Ukraine war de-escalates.

“If Russia achieves some form of partial economic reconnection with Europe, Moscow will be incentivized to reduce its single dependency on China. In that case, the Russia-China relationship may shift from ‘unlimited’ cooperation to a more pragmatic partnership with defined boundaries,” Sun said.

Shen noted that Russia has historically distrusted China in defense cooperation, pointing out that India often receives better military technology.

“This is because Russia knows India won’t reverse-engineer the systems. China, on the other hand, has a long record of doing so,” he said.

However, Schuster believes that as long as Putin remains in power, Russia’s foreign policy will remain rigid—even after the war.

“Wooing Russia away from China is a laudable but impossible goal while Putin is in power,” he said. “Any U.S. effort to do so would require abandoning Ukraine, which would fracture America’s alliances. Our partners in Europe might then consider turning to China to balance against Russia, and China would exploit that.”