Purges and Corruption Are Weakening the Chinese Military’s Ability to Fight

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Chinese communist regime leader Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption purges, intended to tighten political control, are instead disrupting weapons production and raising questions about China’s ability to fight a high-intensity war.

Last year, the global defense industry experienced a boom, with weapons producers in Japan, Germany, South Korea, the United States, and the United Kingdom all posting significant revenue increases as global arms sales reached an all-time high of $679 billion.

Norinco, China’s premier state-owned arms manufacturer for ground-based weapons systems, saw its revenues collapse by 31 percent following the removal of its top leadership. China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) recorded a 16 percent drop after its president was purged. AVIC reported slower aircraft deliveries. China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) saw a 10 percent decline. Only China’s shipbuilding and aero-engine corporations recorded gains.

These revenue declines are rooted in Xi Jinping’s concentration of political control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). His anti-corruption campaign, while publicly framed as a cleanup, has dismantled rival patronage networks and elevated political loyalty over competence. The campaign has purged dozens of senior military and industrial leaders across the PLA, the Central Military Commission, and major weapons manufacturers, disrupting key programs and triggering the postponement and cancellation of major contracts.

Xi’s October 2025 purge of nine top PLA generals marks the largest military shakeup in decades. Those removed include Central Military Commission Vice-Chair He Weidong, Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin, senior political commissars, and key figures involved in personnel, promotions, and operational planning. Many were Xi’s own appointees, revealing both the depth of alleged corruption inside the PLA and possibly Xi’s growing distrust even of his closest allies.

Official rhetoric focused on “disloyalty,” framing the purge as ideological cleansing. Still, it was triggered by investigations into bribery, patronage networks, and corruption in the Rocket Force’s missile and procurement programs.

Over the past two years, two Rocket Force commanders have been removed. Commander Li Yuchao was dismissed and investigated in 2023, and his replacement, Wang Houbin, was purged in 2025. The removal of back-to-back Rocket Force leaders exposes serious structural problems within China’s missile and nuclear forces, casting doubt on their reliability.

The Rocket Force has long been considered China’s most secretive and elite service. It receives priority funding, the highest-level oversight, and direct reporting to Xi. If this branch is riddled with corruption, analysts believe the rest of the PLA may be in even worse condition.

The purges suggest systemic failures across missile procurement, testing, and command integrity. Bribery and kickback schemes appear to have shaped contracts for missile components, launch systems, and support vehicles. Reports of falsified test results indicate that some missile systems may not perform as advertised.

If corruption has penetrated maintenance or logistics, the reliability of nuclear delivery systems cannot be assumed. And if senior officials were compromised, operational discipline and decision-making integrity are also at risk.

The personnel changes have left the Central Military Commission with the highest number of vacancies since the Mao Zedong era, weakening military representation on the CCP Central Committee and creating leadership gaps at the top of China’s command structure. While Xi can replace the purged cadres with loyalists, experience has shown that even his loyalists are susceptible to corruption, making it unclear whether these purges will meaningfully reduce graft. At the same time, prioritizing loyalty over competence is expected to negatively affect the PLA’s deployability.

In the short term, gaps in leadership, combined with the appointment of loyal but possibly less qualified officers, may slow operations, exercises, and Taiwan-related planning while new commanders consolidate control. In the longer term, Xi aims to rebuild a more disciplined, politically obedient PLA, loyal to himself, but such centralization also removes internal checks. The PLA could emerge even more aligned with Xi’s policy goals, even more ideological, and potentially more aggressive.

The consequences of the purges extend beyond industrial profits and senior-level decision-making, directly threatening China’s military modernization and hollowing out key defense industries. U.S. defense assessments say Xi’s purges have disrupted missile, aerospace, and cyber programs, particularly those tied to the Rocket Force, creating delays and exposing gaps in China’s push to field advanced capabilities.

Xi’s awareness of the vulnerabilities created by his own purges may also explain why he reacted so sharply to recent statements from Japan signaling a willingness to support Taiwan’s defense. A PLA weakened by corruption probes, leadership gaps, and political purges is less prepared for a high-intensity conflict, particularly one involving a coordinated U.S.–Japan response.