Xi Jinping Signals His Political Intention From His Inspection of the Combat Center

Commentary On Jan. 28, Xi Jinping visited the joint battle command center of the Central Command Theater in Beijing. This gesture seemed an alert to the U.S. military at a time when Ukraine-Russian tension is high. However, the party media reports gave the opposite signal. Before the Chinese New Year, Xi Jinping inspected the Central Command Theater. The regime’s media reported that Xi was in camouflage uniform like the officers around him. In his address, Xi said to keep a good image, strengthen security, and ensure epidemic prevention and control, on top of his routine indoctrination of strong Party military ideology, strategy, construction, and combat readiness, for the new era and before the upcoming Party national meeting. As a concluding remark, Xi emphasized the troops should engage in combat readiness in order to maintain the stability of society, as well as prevention and control of the pandemic, for the Chinese New Year and the 2022 Winter Olympics. From the media’s report, Xi was more into domestic control to safeguard the upcoming Party’s rubber-stamp legislature meeting, and the Beijing Olympics, in the height of the pandemic in China. A previous inspection of a military command center that was made public was on April 20, 2016, when Xi visited the CMC (Central Military Commission) joint battle command center. In his 2016 inspection, Xi carried a much tougher tone in his talk. He focused on the core function of studying combat and command of the center—absolutely loyal, resourceful in fighting, efficient in commanding, and courageous and capable of winning wars—the ultimate goal of a stronger Chinese army that aims at winning. Beijing is home to both the CMC joint battle command center and the joint battle command center of the Central Command Theater. The joint battle command center of the Central Command Theater is one of the five theaters’ joint battle command centers. All five joint battle command centers are under the umbrella of the CMC joint battle command center. Xi’s inspection of a subordinating command center this year seems to deliver a message to the international community that his focus is on domestic issues. When his “winning wars” was not heard in his remark this year, it further signals that he has no intention to cause trouble in the Taiwan Strait by taking advantage of a possible invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The U.S. Navy has recently conducted training activities in the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea. Visitors hold their mobile phones in front of exhibits showing People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning, during an exhibition on China’s achievements marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the Beijing Exhibition Center, on Sept. 24, 2019. (Jason Lee/File Photo/Reuters) The U.S. State Department’s report on Jan. 12 that rejected China’s unlawful claims of “sovereignty or some form of exclusive jurisdiction over most of the South China Sea” came with no coincidence. On Jan. 13, the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN70) transited the South China Sea with ships of Essex Amphibious Ready Group (ESX ARG); together, they completed joint expeditionary strike force training operations in the South China Sea on Jan. 16. It was a clear signal of deterrence to the regime. The crash-landed F-35C incident shows the intensity of the training operations. Similar high-intensity combat readiness of the USS Carl Vinson in the Western Pacific has continued for several months. There’s nothing the symbolic touring of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning could compare with. After the U.S.-Japan virtual meeting on Jan. 21, two leaders had it clear that they would push back against the regime’s coercion in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. The U.S.-Japan Keen Edge 2022 joint exercise has begun and will continue until Feb. 3; Australia, Japan, and the United States also converged on Guam for Cope North 2022. Obviously, the United States and its allies are stepping up their deterrence against the regime’s aggression. I believe that getting a third term of the Party’s leadership would be Xi Jinping’s first priority in 2022. He would try very hard not to provoke disputes in the international arena. His recent military combat center inspection probably carried the similar message. Of course, rather than paying attention to the message, the United States and its allies would only continue their effective deterrence effort. When the image of Fighter F-35 landed vertically and beautifully on an aircraft carrier was tweeted on Feb. 1, it shows the U.S. Navy will not stop high combat readiness just because of one accident. After the U.S. Navy published a photo of Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2) transiting on the Sulu Sea, on Jan. 29, a demonstration of the U.S. commitment to the region and its long-standing treaty allies—as well as it’s en

Xi Jinping Signals His Political Intention From His Inspection of the Combat Center

Commentary

On Jan. 28, Xi Jinping visited the joint battle command center of the Central Command Theater in Beijing. This gesture seemed an alert to the U.S. military at a time when Ukraine-Russian tension is high. However, the party media reports gave the opposite signal.

Before the Chinese New Year, Xi Jinping inspected the Central Command Theater. The regime’s media reported that Xi was in camouflage uniform like the officers around him.

In his address, Xi said to keep a good image, strengthen security, and ensure epidemic prevention and control, on top of his routine indoctrination of strong Party military ideology, strategy, construction, and combat readiness, for the new era and before the upcoming Party national meeting.

As a concluding remark, Xi emphasized the troops should engage in combat readiness in order to maintain the stability of society, as well as prevention and control of the pandemic, for the Chinese New Year and the 2022 Winter Olympics.

From the media’s report, Xi was more into domestic control to safeguard the upcoming Party’s rubber-stamp legislature meeting, and the Beijing Olympics, in the height of the pandemic in China.

A previous inspection of a military command center that was made public was on April 20, 2016, when Xi visited the CMC (Central Military Commission) joint battle command center.

In his 2016 inspection, Xi carried a much tougher tone in his talk.

He focused on the core function of studying combat and command of the center—absolutely loyal, resourceful in fighting, efficient in commanding, and courageous and capable of winning wars—the ultimate goal of a stronger Chinese army that aims at winning.

Beijing is home to both the CMC joint battle command center and the joint battle command center of the Central Command Theater.

The joint battle command center of the Central Command Theater is one of the five theaters’ joint battle command centers. All five joint battle command centers are under the umbrella of the CMC joint battle command center.

Xi’s inspection of a subordinating command center this year seems to deliver a message to the international community that his focus is on domestic issues. When his “winning wars” was not heard in his remark this year, it further signals that he has no intention to cause trouble in the Taiwan Strait by taking advantage of a possible invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

The U.S. Navy has recently conducted training activities in the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea.

TAIWAN-CHINA-DEFENCE
Visitors hold their mobile phones in front of exhibits showing People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning, during an exhibition on China’s achievements marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the Beijing Exhibition Center, on Sept. 24, 2019. (Jason Lee/File Photo/Reuters)

The U.S. State Department’s report on Jan. 12 that rejected China’s unlawful claims of “sovereignty or some form of exclusive jurisdiction over most of the South China Sea” came with no coincidence. On Jan. 13, the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN70) transited the South China Sea with ships of Essex Amphibious Ready Group (ESX ARG); together, they completed joint expeditionary strike force training operations in the South China Sea on Jan. 16.

It was a clear signal of deterrence to the regime. The crash-landed F-35C incident shows the intensity of the training operations. Similar high-intensity combat readiness of the USS Carl Vinson in the Western Pacific has continued for several months. There’s nothing the symbolic touring of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning could compare with.

After the U.S.-Japan virtual meeting on Jan. 21, two leaders had it clear that they would push back against the regime’s coercion in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. The U.S.-Japan Keen Edge 2022 joint exercise has begun and will continue until Feb. 3; Australia, Japan, and the United States also converged on Guam for Cope North 2022.

Obviously, the United States and its allies are stepping up their deterrence against the regime’s aggression.

I believe that getting a third term of the Party’s leadership would be Xi Jinping’s first priority in 2022. He would try very hard not to provoke disputes in the international arena. His recent military combat center inspection probably carried the similar message.

Of course, rather than paying attention to the message, the United States and its allies would only continue their effective deterrence effort.

When the image of Fighter F-35 landed vertically and beautifully on an aircraft carrier was tweeted on Feb. 1, it shows the U.S. Navy will not stop high combat readiness just because of one accident.

After the U.S. Navy published a photo of Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2) transiting on the Sulu Sea, on Jan. 29, a demonstration of the U.S. commitment to the region and its long-standing treaty allies—as well as it’s ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific—we shall continue to observe what Xi would do after the 2022 Winter Olympics.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.


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Shen Zhou, a former design engineer for military vehicles, is a China observer who has paid close attention to the Chinese regime’s military expansion over the years. He started contributing to The Epoch Times in 2020.