US–China Shipping Wars 

US–China Shipping Wars 

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Commentary

The Trump administration’s new China port fees are one small part of a much broader goal of not only reducing China’s hold on American shipping but also stopping China from dominating ports around the world.

The administration has announced new port fees for Chinese ships docking in the United States, following an investigation by the U.S. Trade Representative that found Beijing used subsidies and unfair pricing to dominate the global shipping and shipbuilding industries. The fees aim to rebalance trans-Pacific trade, support U.S.-flag carriers and shipyards, and counter China’s growing dominance over foreign ports.

Under the plan, Chinese-linked ships will be charged $50 per net ton per trip, rising to $140 by 2028, while Chinese-built ships will be charged $18 per net ton, increasing to $33 by 2028. Security analysts also warn that China now controls an extensive network of overseas ports, many of which are dual-use and capable of supporting the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has moved quickly to counter the new U.S. port fees. China’s largest carrier, COSCO, has already begun shifting Chinese-built vessels out of U.S.-bound routes, maintaining overall service capacity but forcing shippers to adjust costs, routing, and supply chain strategies. At the same time, Beijing has rewritten its maritime laws to authorize retaliatory measures, including new fees, restrictions, or outright bans on ships from countries deemed discriminatory toward Chinese operators.

China has revised its maritime transport rules to authorize retaliatory measures against countries deemed discriminatory toward Chinese operators. Under the amendments, signed by Premier Li Qiang and retroactive to Sept. 28, China will take “necessary countermeasures against countries or regions that impose or support discriminatory bans, restrictions, or similar measures targeting Chinese operators, vessels, or crew engaged in international maritime transport and related services,” Chinese state-run media Xinhua reported. While the regulations do not specifically name the United States, they are clearly aimed at the new port charges.

Yet the impact on the United States itself is expected to be limited. The U.S.-flagged fleet accounts for just 0.6 percent of global deadweight tonnage, fewer than 100 oceangoing vessels, compared with more than 5,500 Chinese ships. State-owned COSCO alone controls 10.6 percent of global container capacity.

Because so few U.S. vessels dock in China, there are hardly any American ships for Beijing to target with retaliatory fees. Most trade is one-directional, with China exporting $438.9 billion in goods to the United States in 2024, versus only $143.5 billion flowing the other way. The vast majority of this cargo is carried on Chinese or third-country vessels, rather than U.S.-flag ships. As a result, the CCP’s retaliation would primarily fall on international shipping lines rather than directly on the United States, making its response more symbolic than substantive.

Beyond imposing new fees on Chinese vessels at U.S. ports, President Donald Trump is tackling Beijing’s global port dominance. Washington fears dependence on foreign-owned fleets and terminals leaves the U.S. vulnerable in a conflict.

China has expanded its 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, investing in 129 overseas ports, 17 of which have majority Chinese ownership, spanning Latin America, Africa, and Europe. In Africa alone, Chinese-backed facilities grew from two in 2000 to 61 by 2022. Examples include the $3.6 billion Chancay port in Peru, which is majority-owned by COSCO, securing access to exports of lithium, copper, soy, and beef.

Many of these ports sit near critical mineral and energy resources, giving China leverage over supply chains and host nations, and the potential to repurpose them for military use. Analysts warn that 14 of China’s 17 majority-owned ports could double as naval bases, with Djibouti already hosting a Chinese facility and having attempted to establish one in Equatorial Guinea.

The risks extend to the United States itself. A 2024 House joint select committee report revealed that nearly 80 percent of U.S. ship-to-shore cranes are sourced from Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industry (ZPMC), a Chinese state-owned enterprise that dominates 70 percent of the global market through subsidies, cheap labor, and noncompetitive pricing. With no domestic alternatives, U.S. ports remain dependent on Chinese equipment.

Contracts often allowed components from Western companies, such as ABB and Siemens, to be shipped to ZPMC’s Changxing base, located next to a Chinese navy shipyard, for installation. The congressional investigations also discovered unauthorized cellular modems embedded in cranes bound for U.S. ports, creating potential backdoors for espionage.

Two Chinese state-owned enterprises already control portions of five U.S. ports, underscoring the vulnerability of Commercial Strategic Seaports vital to military logistics. Guam is especially exposed, with critical infrastructure lacking full federal support. Beyond the United States, Chinese stakes in ports from Greece’s Piraeus and Spain’s Valencia and Bilbao to Panama, Jamaica’s Kingston hub, Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Australia’s Darwin Port provide Beijing with potential tools for espionage, disruption, and military leverage.

The Trump administration is mounting a coordinated effort to reclaim maritime power, expand allied control of key ports, and reduce China’s leverage over global supply chains. Its strategy includes tariffs, new port fees, support for Western port investment, expansion of U.S. shipbuilding, growth of U.S.-controlled registries, and reviews of key maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Gibraltar. Additional measures under consideration involve backing U.S. and allied companies to purchase Chinese stakes in ports.

Beijing has predictably denounced these moves as “hegemonism and bullying,” while Washington insists the struggle is not only about trade but also about national security.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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