US Federal Reserve Analysis Reveals the Depths of China’s Economic Problems
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For years, the chief source of suspicion about the validity of official Chinese statistics has been their smooth path over time. The Fed’s analysts noted this. For the first 20 years of this century, China’s official growth numbers showed almost no variation from one year to the next—less than one percentage point. Most countries show swings of up to 5 percentage points, some even more.
But the Fed’s team also noted that starting in the COVID-19 pandemic year 2020 and since, the variability of China’s official figures has increased to levels that are about the same as most other economies and more than many. The change has not erased suspicions of official Chinese figures, but it has reduced them considerably.
The Fed’s analysts then tested the 5 percent real growth reported for China’s real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024 and the tracking to about 5 percent real growth targeted for this year. They did this by checking the official figures against an array of alternative measures—some from Chinese and some from other sources. From this rather elaborate procedure, they conclude that the 5 percent official figures are reasonably accurate. That is interesting.
What is more interesting and revealing is how the Fed’s analysis of various economic sectors shows a narrowing of the economy and poor growth prospects going forward.
It is hardly surprising that the Fed identifies China’s biggest economic problem as the ongoing property crisis that began to unfold in such a dramatic way in 2021 with the failure of the giant developer, Evergrande.
According to the Fed’s calculations, the crisis has already brought residential construction down 40 percent from pre-crisis highs and property sales down 70 percent. And though the pace of decline has slowed recently, the fallout from this crisis continues to hold back China’s overall pace of growth. Since at one time, residential construction constituted some 30 percent of the economy and alone contributed 1 percentage point a year to overall growth rates, the crisis, the Fed analysts noted, has created a huge hole in the economy that needs tremendous offsets to generate any growth at all, much less the 5 percent recorded in 2024 and targeted for 2025.
Fed analysts identify two areas that at least partially fill that gap: one is exports and the other is investment by the public sector. After the pandemic, Chinese exports surged. Part of the reason was that world trade had shifted decisively from services to goods, and that very much suited the Chinese economy.
The Fed calculates that Chinese exports between 2020 and 2024 rose at a more rapid rate than during any other five-year period for which these analysts had data. China’s huge balance of payments surplus during that time has the same effect from another angle.
While this export surge rescued some overall growth from the ill effects of the property crisis, Beijing generated another source of growth with heavy public investment in industry, especially productive capacity in high-technology, semiconductors, for one, quantum computing, electric vehicles, and batteries. Together, these alternative growth engines allowed China to record a 5 percent growth in 2024 and a similar pace earlier this year.
While the Fed’s analysis indicates that recent official data have not exaggerated GDP growth, that same analysis has made clear China’s limited growth potential, if not forever, then for the foreseeable future. Beijing may deny this reality and even manipulate statistics to support that denial, but the reality is clear, nonetheless.


