The Washington Declaration: Implications for Taiwan and East Asia

Commentary

Below are a series of questions asked to me by “Taiwan Talks,” one of Taiwan’s English TV programs, regarding recent events between South Korea, the United States, and the Indo-Pacific region.

What is the significance of the “Washington Declaration” agreed to by President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea?

The “Washington Declaration” is meant to counter the growing nuclear threat from North Korea (DPRK) with a set of new deterrence measures by the United States in support of South Korea.

Recall that in September 2022, DPRK announced its three no’s: “absolutely no denuclearization, no negotiation, and no bargaining chip to trade,” regardless if international sanctions were lifted. The Washington Declaration is a response to increased North Korean belligerence through its public statements and over 100 long-range missile tests since the beginning of 2022. Remember that after then-President Donald Trump met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, DPRK ceased its long-range rocket testing until Trump’s departure in 2021.

In February 2022, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) conducted a poll in South Korea, indicating that 71 percent of participants (a super majority) wanted their country to build its own nuclear weapons.

CCGA summarized the poll results: “Support for nuclear weapons is robust, with 71 percent in favor of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons, while 56 percent support deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea. However, when asked to choose between these two options, the public overwhelmingly prefers an independent arsenal (67 percent) over U.S. deployment (9 percent). Interestingly, 40 percent oppose U.S. deployment, while just 26 percent oppose a domestic nuclear arsenal.”

CCGA conducted the poll before the series of missile testing and other aggressive actions taken by the North Koreans. In other words, the numbers would be higher now because of North Korea’s subsequent actions. Examples include the following actions:

• DPRK missile tests: The DPRK conducted over 95 missile launches in 2022. DPRK conducted another 30 missile tests since the beginning of 2023 until April.
• DPRK missiles overflying Japan: Since the August 2022 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercise near Taiwan, the DPRK has launched at least five missiles over Japan, scaring politicians and the population on the following dates: Oct. 4, 2022, Nov. 3, 2022, Feb. 18 and 20, and April 13.
• Solid rocket-fueled ICBM: The DPRK tested its first solid rocket-fueled ICBM on April 13. The solid rocket fuel technology is suspected to be similar to the Russian Iskander rocket. The Russians supplying this technology could be one reason why North Korea provided Russia with massive supplies for Moscow’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
• Implications of solid rocket-fueled missiles: Solid-fueled rockets mean that if the DPRK decided to attack a country, the country would have little foreknowledge because liquid-fueled missiles require time to fill the fuel tanks, and solid-fueled rockets do not. The DPRK will have a launch on warning capability, and this would be the first instance that North Korea demonstrated this capability for its ICBMs. Not only is South Korea at risk, but also Japan, the United States, and even Taiwan. Furthermore, a solid rocket-fueled missile is the technology needed for sea-launched nuclear ballistic missiles.

Before visiting the United States, Yoon said he would consider supplying arms to Ukraine if there was a civilian humanitarian crisis. This is a reversal of his non-military aid stand due to South Korea’s attempt to “avoid antagonizing Russia due to its companies operating there and Moscow’s influence over North Korea.”

What does this new agreement mean for East Asia, including Japan and Taiwan?

• The United States is reinforcing its alliances, which sends deterrence messages to North Korea and China.
• Japan and South Korea are becoming closer due to the common threats: North Korea and China.
• European countries are building their alliances with Indo-Pacific countries (South Korea and Japan are in negotiations for a security agreement, recent Japanese-UK and Australia agreements, and France is in negotiations with Japan).
• The Washington agreement puts pressure on the Japanese to make a similar arrangement with the United States. It could allay the concerns of the Japanese, who also want their own nuclear capability independent of the United States.
• On the economic side, South Korea agreed to limit its sales of high-end semiconductors to China even though this would hurt its economy.

What does this mean for Taiwan?

Biden’s speech on the White House lawn with Yoon noted that their discussions included “promoting peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and beyond.” In other words, South Korea has a role in promoting peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea, and beyond. Until now, the South Korean government has argued that the North Korean challenge will keep it too busy to get involved in other conflict areas.

Biden also convinced Yoon to send military aid to Ukraine for the first time—South Korea tried to avoid sending military aid to Ukraine claiming neutrality in the conflict.

The aggression demonstrated by North Korea and China for the past two years has forced a response from the countries near China and North Korea. This response is twofold:

• Increase domestic defense capabilities of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, and others.
• Increase international defense alliances between Indo-Pacific countries and European countries.

As countries friendly to Taiwan become closer in their relationship, this helps Taiwan if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decides to conduct a military operation against it. In other words, as these countries become more NATO-like (train together, use a common operating picture to conduct military operations, and make plans together to deconflict actions), Taiwan looks more like Ukraine. Someday, Taiwan could become part of this new developing alliance structure.

Taiwan has a unique resource that no other country, perhaps except Singapore, has—a large number of Chinese linguists, native linguists. Consequently, Taiwan can assist the developing alliance by providing information, intelligence—indications and warnings—on the activities of the PLA in and around the Taiwan Strait, as well as provide strategic information on what the CCP and its sub-elements are doing in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

What does this current agreement mean at the military level?

The United States will now have a port facility to use in South Korea for its nuclear submarines—nuclear attack (SSNs) and nuclear ballistic/cruise missile submarines (SSBN/SSCM). The United States did not have any facility for its submarines in East Asia to dock at. It is also a visible way of reminding North Korea that the United States maintains a deterrence posture against the North Korean nuclear threat.

The visible submarine presence also reminds China that the United States is nearby. The SLBMs and SLCMs can reach anywhere in China if the U.S. submarines are in the East China Sea or the western Pacific Ocean.

This agreement released some internal pressure on South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons. According to a 2022 survey, 71 percent of South Koreans want their country to have its own nuclear weapons.

What future agreements would you predict based on the Washington Declaration and other agreements in the region?

Based on my analysis of strategic trends in the Indo-Pacific region and based on Abraham Lincoln’s wisdom that “the best way to predict the future is to create it,” the following are future new agreements I predict will occur if each country has the political will. These enhancements will be in the following areas: bilateral security agreements, the Quad, and AUKUS. An enhanced AUKUS will have the greatest strategic effect on the region because of the deterrence factor.

One of my colleagues suggested that perhaps as part of the Washington Declaration, the United States could include South Korea in the Quad, AUKUS, and even the G-7.

Enhanced Security Agreements

Enhancing Bilateral Security Agreements

Yoon claimed he would focus on enhancing South Korea bilateral relations “to strengthen information sharing, joint contingency planning and joint execution of the plans.” But this could not only apply to current allies (the United States), but new allies like Australia, Japan, Philippines, and maybe someday Taiwan. Hopefully, once multiple bilateral treaties exist, these governments can transition them into an Indo-Pacific treaty alliance.

Recent announcements from Japan and South Korea on intelligence sharing and cooperating on technology trade security indicate that their common threats are driving them faster together.

Expand Quad (Japan, India, Australia, and U.S.)

The Quad will add South Korea (a Quint), which John Bolton mentioned in his speech in Taipei earlier this month, and Yoon has shown strong interest in joining the Quad since becoming president. Finally, Taiwan could be an associate partner or some new membership category.

Expand AUKUS (Australia, UK, U.S.)

South Korea should be added to AUKUS as well as Japan. Taiwan again could play some sort of role, perhaps a location to dock friendly countries’ nuclear submarines once a submarine base is available on the east side of the island. A follow-on article on an expanded AUKUS will be published to describe what the implications would look like.

Summary

If the enhanced relationships come to fruition, then communist China will be greatly deterred from its expansionist plans, thereby delaying the PLA’s military action against Taiwan, the South China Sea, and other claimed areas. These overlapping agreements create a thickening of relationships and synergistic resilience between threatened countries. These enhanced agreements provide a strong positive trend for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific region.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.