The Rise of Militarism in China
Udumbara
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Commentary
For the past several years, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping has been reshaping China’s domestic and international identity by promoting an increasingly militaristic national mood, objectives, and global military posture.
This is evident in Xi’s assertive rhetoric and the regime’s aggressive regional actions. But it’s also notable in China’s pro-military state media, the emergence of war-minded young military leaders, growing numbers of military personnel, and the prominence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Chinese films.
All of these elements signal a strategic pivot toward projecting strength and nationalism, both of which are expressions of the CCP’s near-term goal of China’s “Great Rejuvenation.”
Understanding the meaning behind communist China’s accelerating militarism is crucial for grasping the CCP’s intentions in 2025 and beyond.
Beijing Expanding Military Presence Abroad
The PLA active duty forces are estimated to be about 2 million, with another 2 million in reserve, according to the U.S. Defense Department. But more critically, the Chinese regime’s assertiveness in areas such as the Indo-Pacific reflects a militarized foreign policy.This is particularly true in disputed or strategic territories. The most striking example is the militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea. Since 2013, China has reclaimed more than 3,200 acres in the Spratly Islands, equipping them with anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and runways, despite Xi’s 2015 pledge to then-U.S. President Barack Obama against militarization.
Additionally, recent naval exercises aimed at intimidating Australia and New Zealand have been largely successful, raising tensions in the region, with the tacit threat of Beijing being able to assert regional sovereignty over its neighbors.
Furthermore, the regime’s increased military exercises near Taiwan, including joint air and naval operations simulating blockades, underscore its focus on denying U.S. and allied access to strategic corridors like the Bashi Channel. But China’s military presence extends far beyond the Asia-Pacific region, to sea gates and ports around the world, from Djibouti to Panama.
Such actions and developments project power and challenge international maritime norms and current security architectures, risking escalation.
PLA Touted by State Media, Chinese Films
The state-controlled media is driving the militaristic narrative into China’s cultural consciousness, portraying the PLA as a symbol of national pride and global influence.The blockbuster film “The Battle at Lake Changjin” (2021) glorifies Chinese soldiers in the Korean War. State media praised the film for its cultural confidence, reinforcing Xi’s call for a stronger global voice.
In 2017, “Wolf Warrior 2” celebrated Chinese nationalism, military prowess, and extermination for anyone who offends China.
Such films align with Beijing’s plan to use cinema to elevate the PLA’s image at home and abroad, and the content promotes nationalism. Still, the domestic success of such movies contrasts with overseas criticism, highlighting the CCP’s struggle to balance internal propaganda with global perceptions. Critics of the CCP’s cinematic propaganda, however, are jailed or publicly shamed.
Xi Jinping’s Militaristic Rhetoric
Xi’s speeches consistently frame the PLA as central to the CCP’s global ambitions. At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, he emphasized “intensifying and accelerating” PLA modernization, aiming for a “world-class” military by 2049, with 2027 as a key milestone for integrated mechanization and informatization.In 2023, at the National People’s Congress, he called for a “great wall of steel” to safeguard sovereignty, security, and development.
This “holistic” rhetoric ties military strength to national rejuvenation, with Xi appearing in military settings to cement his authority. The CCP’s focus on strategic deterrence and deploying forces in diversified ways could signal readiness for conflict, particularly over Taiwan.
War-Minded Young Military Leadership
Xi’s military reforms have elevated younger, operationally-focused leaders, reflecting a war-ready mindset. In 2023, Xi promoted Admiral Hu Zhongming (born 1964) to PLA Navy commander and Admiral Dong Jun as defense minister, both with extensive naval experience. These appointments prioritize warfighting expertise over bureaucratic roles, aligning with Xi’s goal of preparing for contingencies like a Taiwan conflict.Of course, the PLA’s political commissars remain intrusive and controlling on behalf of the Party. Still, these younger leaders bring enhanced capabilities like joint theater commands modeled on U.S. structures and fewer inhibitions. Their rise signals a shift toward a more aggressive, capable military culture under Xi’s direct oversight.
In essence, the PLA’s growth underscores Beijing’s militaristic ambitions.
Military and Naval Expansion
China is rapidly expanding its nuclear weapons, conventional weapons systems, and cyber and space capabilities. As of 2025, China’s navy is expected to grow to 395 ships, and 435 ships by 2030. Furthermore, China’s ship-building capacity is of concern to U.S. military planners.Recent naval developments include the Type 075 amphibious assault ship, designed for island seizures, with at least three active in 2025, according to state-run Global Times. China’s regional naval expansion is rapid and extensive, and supports Xi’s maritime strategy, shifting China from a land-focused to a sea-going power. These developments collectively pose a direct threat to U.S. military dominance in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
Implications and Context
This multifaceted militarism serves multiple CCP goals. Domestically, it helps gin up nationalistic support for the CCP, whose policies are crushing the economy. It also prepares the new generation of military leaders for a battle-ready mindset and redefines economic threats as threats to national security.That’s critical to deflect blame for economic decline from the CCP and toward foreign actors, such as the United States and its regional allies. In that context, it reminds potential regional and global adversaries of China’s growing dominance in Asia and elsewhere.
Japan’s 2022 Defense White Paper identified the PLA’s influence as a security risk and an attack on Taiwan as a national security threat to Japan. Consequently, Japan is reorganizing its defense posture to counter the Chinese regime’s growing military threat.
This rise of militarism that blends hard power with cultural propaganda certainly reflects the CCP’s vision of a rejuvenated China, but it’s not without risks and reactions.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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