The Ousting of 9 Chinese Generals Shows Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Has Failed
Udumbara
.
A Dramatic Purge
The nine include some of the most senior officers in the PLA: Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman He Weidong, former CMC Political Work Department chief Miao Hua, and several former theater commanders and service chiefs, including Lin Xiangyang of the Eastern Theater Command, Wang Houbin of the Rocket Force, and Wang Chunning of the People’s Armed Police.According to the Ministry of National Defense, these officers were accused of committing “disciplinary violations and allegedly serious duty-related crimes.”
However, Chinese state media quickly suggested there was more to the story. The PLA’s official newspaper, PLA Daily, published an editorial linking the purge to the lingering “toxic legacy” of two disgraced former CMC vice chairmen—Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou—who were removed from their posts a decade ago.
Did Xi’s Own Men Turn Against Him?
Most of these generals were personally promoted by Xi. Several served in the former 31st Army Group, stationed in Fujian, where Xi built his early political career. Miao Hua and Lin Xiangyang even worked directly under Xi during that period. Others, such as He Weidong and Qin Shutong, also rose through the ranks of the 31st Army Group and were long considered Xi’s most loyal military leaders.Xi lacks real military experience and has long depended on the loyalty of the purged generals to assert control over the PLA. So would it make sense for Xi to purge his own protégés?
Some observers suggest they may have formed factions or shown insufficient loyalty. But that seems unlikely. In the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) system, the military does not initiate coups, and it strictly follows the Party’s orders. From Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, “the Party commands the gun” has been an unbreakable rule.
A Political Cleansing Disguised as Anti-Corruption
A more plausible explanation is that the purge reflects internal power struggles. Perhaps even that others are dismantling Xi’s military network within the system.Alternatively, if corruption really is the reason, that poses a different problem. Corruption in China’s military has long been systemic, and Xi’s anti-corruption campaign was supposed to have fixed it. If his closest allies are now the ones falling from grace, it suggests the opposite—that Xi’s concentration of power has merely created new forms of corruption rooted in personal loyalty and unchecked authority.
The End of the CCP’s ‘Reform Itself’ Myth
This failure goes beyond corruption. It strikes at the heart of the CCP’s claim that it can “reform itself from within.”In 1945, during a famous conversation with educator Huang Yanpei, Mao Zedong claimed that democracy was the key to breaking China’s dynastic cycle of rise and fall that had plagued Chinese history. After taking power in 1949, however, Mao replaced that idea with “continuing revolution,” which culminated in the disastrous and brutal Cultural Revolution.
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign was essentially the CCP’s last attempt at the “reform itself” myth —the belief that the Party can cleanse itself without external checks or institutional limits.
However, this latest purge shows that corruption persists; it seems to reemerge faster than it can be eliminated. If Xi’s appointees are committing the same so-called crimes as their predecessors, then the problem lies mainly with the CCP’s system itself, not just individual moral lapses.
Xi’s title as chairman of the Central Military Commission gives him absolute control over the armed forces. If half of his top generals have proven to be “corrupt” or “disloyal,” that failure rests squarely with him. By centralizing authority, Xi has assumed full accountability and liability. The CCP’s assertion that it can reform itself has proven false, and its system is unsalvageable.
