The CCP’s Strategic Caution in the Israel–Iran Conflict

Udumbara Udumbara
Jul 3, 2025 - 10:08 Updated: Jul 3, 2025 - 09:56
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The CCP’s Strategic Caution in the Israel–Iran Conflict
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Commentary

The recent 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel, followed by U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, has created a strategic dilemma for Chinese leader Xi Jinping, unlike past Middle Eastern crises.

Beijing had no direct stake in the Israel–Hamas war or the conflict in Ukraine and maintained a façade of neutrality, despite economically backing Moscow. In contrast, the Iran crisis posed a direct threat to China’s energy security and regional economic interests.

Globally, China holds major investments, often through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in resource-rich but unstable regions like Africa and Burma, also known as Myanmar. Yet Beijing typically avoids direct military involvement, limiting its role to economic aid or arms sales.

A key obstacle to the Chinese regime achieving true superpower status is its reluctance to lead on global security concerns or deploy the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) abroad. Some analysts believe this restraint reflects lessons Beijing learned from U.S. mistakes in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

In addition to Beijing’s general reluctance to become involved in foreign wars, the Israel–Iran conflict presented a further complication: it directly involved the United States. For years, Taiwan has been viewed as the most likely flashpoint for a military clash between the two powers. A war over Taiwan would carry both economic and political stakes for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with Xi seeking to solidify his legacy by “reunifying” China, despite the fact that Taiwan has never been part of the People’s Republic of China.

By contrast, the CCP’s interests in Iran are primarily economic, offering far less incentive for Xi to risk direct confrontation with Washington, even within the context of the growing China–Russia–Iran axis. Yet Beijing cannot simply abandon Tehran. China depends on Iranian oil, holds significant regional investments, and sees Iran’s geographic position as strategically important. This forces the CCP to navigate a delicate balancing act: defending Chinese interests while avoiding entanglement in a wider war.

China’s relationship with Iran is primarily energy-based. Iran supplies China with about 43 million barrels of oil per month, more than 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports, making up roughly 13.6 percent of China’s crude imports. These flows continue despite U.S. sanctions, often routed covertly through third countries.

If the Israel–Iran conflict had been prolonged with U.S. involvement, it could have seriously disrupted Iran’s oil production and exports. Further compounding the risk, Iran’s parliament has voted to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to U.S. airstrikes, a move pending approval by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.

The Strait of Hormuz is a vital chokepoint between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, carrying nearly 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies. For China, the consequences of closure would be severe: not only would Iranian oil be cut off, but crude and LNG imports from other Arab states would also be at risk. More than 30 percent of China’s LNG imports from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pass through this narrow waterway, making any disruption a direct threat to China’s energy security.
Despite strong energy ties, China’s investment in Iran remains limited, under $5 billion since 2007, compared to nearly $15 billion in Saudi Arabia between 2007 and 2024, and more than $8.1 billion in the UAE between 2013 and 2022. Although Beijing has signed major oil, refinery, and infrastructure deals with Iran, many have stalled due to sanctions and financing hurdles.
Meanwhile, China has expanded its economic presence across the Persian Gulf region, with Arab–China trade topping $400 billion in 2024 and all 22 Arab League nations participating in the Belt and Road Initiative. A U.S.–Iran war could endanger not only China’s energy lifeline but also its broader economic footprint in the region.

Iran also plays a key role in China’s effort to build a global order outside U.S. influence. While Beijing is unlikely to defend Tehran militarily, it seeks to avoid regime collapse, as Iran is a strategic partner in blocs like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which support the CCP’s non-Western security vision. The two countries formalized their partnership in a 25-year cooperation pact in 2021, though Chinese investment remains cautious due to sanctions risk.

Beijing has used the Israel–Iran conflict, like the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, to reinforce its core message that the U.S.-led international order is unstable, biased, and in decline. This narrative was spotlighted at the recent SCO defense ministers’ meeting in China’s Qingdao, held alongside a NATO summit—a symbolic clash between two competing global visions: one led by the United States and its allies, the other increasingly shaped by China.
At the meeting, Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun condemned U.S. “hegemonic” behavior and promoted Beijing’s alternative security model. Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, on his first foreign visit since the Israel–Iran conflict, thanked China for its support and urged it to take a greater role in maintaining the cease-fire and regional stability.

While Beijing criticized Israel’s strike on Iranian leaders and the subsequent U.S. bombings of Iran’s three nuclear sites, its response has been mostly rhetorical, focused on United Nations statements rather than direct mediation or involvement. This reflects the CCP’s broader pattern of issuing sharp verbal condemnations without assuming a major conflict-resolution role.

Still, the crisis offers strategic openings. With U.S. attention diverted to the Middle East, the Chinese regime may seek to capitalize elsewhere, particularly in the South China Sea, where it recently ramped up naval and air activity. As Washington remains preoccupied, Beijing gains room to act more assertively in its core strategic zones while portraying itself as a more stable alternative to Western leadership.
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Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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