Shangri-La Dialogue: Implications for Asia-Pacific Stability

Udumbara Udumbara
Jun 8, 2025 - 09:53 Updated: Jun 7, 2025 - 19:17
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Shangri-La Dialogue: Implications for Asia-Pacific Stability
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Commentary
As May closed, delegates from 47 countries gathered in Singapore for the 22nd annual Shangri-La Dialogue. Named for the hotel where it is held and sponsored by London’s prestigious Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), attendees included prime ministers, defense ministers, and policymakers with Indo-Pacific security as its primary focus of attention. 

This year’s gathering was conspicuous not only for those who attended but also for those who did not: China had previously announced that, for the first time in five years, its defense minister, currently Admiral Dong Jun, would not be present. Whether this was because he was, as rumored but officially denied, under investigation for unspecified transgressions, or because Chinese leader Xi Jinping had decided to indicate his dissatisfaction with the organization, China would be represented by a delegation from the country’s National Defense University (NDU).

That this snub was not due to a lack of interest in the area was clear: Premier Li Qiang visited Indonesia en route to Malaysia for the first-ever meeting of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to coordinate trade policies, and, a few days earlier, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had hosted the foreign ministers of 11 Pacific Island states, promising donations to help combat climate change and offering to facilitate negotiations for bilateral trade deals under which the participants could export more to China.

Back in Singapore, French President Emmanuel Macron began the proceedings with a polished keynote address, chiding Beijing for the disconnect between its opposition to the expansion of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) to Asia, while at the same time accepting North Korean participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
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France, he reminded delegates, is an Indo-Pacific state by virtue of its overseas territories in the area, as well as a European state. The time for the Non-Aligned Movement, begun at the Bandung meeting in the mid-1950s, had passed: It was time for a U.S.-Indo-Pacific coalition for peace and prosperity in the region, with China welcome to join.
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All eyes were on the address the next day by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who did not disappoint, stating unequivocally that there is “no reason to sugarcoat it“ and ”the threat China poses is real and it could be imminent.” The United States had been an Indo-Pacific state since early in its existence and would continue to be an active player, he said, pointedly adding that “we are here ... and somebody else isn’t.”  

President Donald Trump, Hegseth continued, seeks peace, which means peace through strength. The warrior ethos is back: defense is to be color-blind, gender neutral, and merit-based. There will be a 13 percent increase in American defense spending, including new submarines, the Golden Dome to defend against incoming missiles, deployment of the sixth-generation F-47 fighter jet, hypersonic weapons, and increased investment in American shipyards. A strong military is the best deterrent against aggression. Any attempt to take Taiwan by force would “result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world,” the defense secretary said.

Putting America first, Hegseth stressed, didn’t mean America alone. America’s allies and partners are expected to contribute: this may be tough love, but it is love nonetheless. Progress has been made, Hegseth noted, citing sundry military cooperation agreements with states in the area.

Member of NDU delegation Zhang Qi immediately riposted that the multilateral alliances and frameworks in this region, such as the Quad (United States–Japan–Australia–India) and AUKUS (United States–United Kingdom–Australia), did not include ASEAN countries. Hence, did the United States truly support ASEAN’s centrality? Zhang, however, conveniently ignored the military exercises that the United States, Australia, and Japan had performed with several ASEAN countries, the transfer of defense-related equipment, and cooperation in other fields, such as professional training programs.

The Chinese foreign ministry issued “stern representations” against Hegseth’s “negative” remarks on the South China Sea, according to Chinese state media Global Times, and that “there has never been a problem with freedom of navigation or overflight in the South China Sea.” This would seem belied by the subsequent address by Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro’s charge that China was inconsistent in word and deed in its conduct in the South China Sea.

A special address by Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia was heavy on uncontested truisms like respect for sovereignty, the importance of consensus, and the need for continued dialogue. Less characterized by content than bon mots—such as “habits of the heart” could lead to “habits of cooperation”; “trade is not a soft power indulgence”; and let us not allow “strategic fatigue to dull our moral clarity”—he advocated “active non-alignment” and the importance of a code of conduct for settling disputes.
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Unmentioned was that the code of conduct has been under negotiation since 2002, when a more loosely constructed Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed. China seeks a flexible, non-binding code while ASEAN wants a legally binding code, but there has been no resolution. With all ASEAN countries dependent on trade with China to varying degrees, it is difficult for the group to reach consensus on most matters. 
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Notably, ASEAN did not issue any official statement referring to the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration that rejected Beijing’s expansive nine-dash line claim on the South China Sea. With China insistent on its position and disarray within ASEAN, even on matters of international law, it is highly unlikely that a satisfactory code of conduct can be agreed upon. Beijing continues to consolidate its claims in the area. Not surprisingly, Anwar ducked a question from a Filipino delegate on China’s opposition to Malaysia developing the Luconia Shoals, which are incontestably within Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone, but lie inside the nine-dashed line. 

Given this situation, it is unlikely that, with the possible exception of the Philippines and perhaps Vietnam, ASEAN will heed Hegseth’s call to work together with the United States to deter Chinese aggression or participate in the kind of coalitions advocated by Macron. How the American government responds remains to be seen.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
 
 
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