Preventing Another Pearl Harbor: Wargaming a Chinese Surprise Attack

Preventing Another Pearl Harbor: Wargaming a Chinese Surprise Attack. Is the U.S. military prepared to deter a potential Pearl Harbor–style surprise attack by the Chinese communist regime?

Preventing Another Pearl Harbor: Wargaming a Chinese Surprise Attack

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Commentary

As U.S.–China tensions escalate, the U.S. military is preparing for the possibility of a major war with the Chinese Communist regime—one that could begin with a surprise attack.

The top priority in any U.S.–China war game scenario is preventing a repeat of Pearl Harbor.

On Dec. 7, 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor—even knowing it couldn’t win a war against the United States—in an attempt to prevent the United States from interfering with its plans in Southeast Asia. The U.S. military was caught off guard and suffered heavy losses, triggering the start of the Pacific War.

Recently, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been aggressively building up its military to counter the United States, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) openly confronting U.S. forces and allies across the western Pacific. The PLA has made breaking through the First Island Chain a key objective.

The good news is that the United States has begun to take the threat seriously.

At the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned in a May 31 speech that the threat from communist China is “real” and potentially “imminent.”

He emphasized that Washington aims to prevent war through strengthened deterrence in cooperation with allies. But he also issued a clear warning: “If deterrence fails ... we are prepared to do what the Department of Defense does best: to fight and win, decisively.”

While China currently lacks the conventional weapons to strike Hawaii directly, it does have the capability to hit U.S. bases in Japan and potentially Guam.

If the PLA moves on Taiwan, Beijing’s fear is U.S. intervention. A simultaneous preemptive strike on U.S. forces in the Western Pacific—mirroring Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor—is a likely scenario.

That raises a key question for the U.S. military: Can it prevent another Pearl Harbor?

Potential PLA Attack Strategies

Land-Based Missiles

An effective starting point for assessing potential PLA attack strategies is its arsenal of land-based missile systems. The following outlines key platforms and their strategic significance.

DF-16 (Dongfeng-16): With a range of 1,000 km (about 621 miles), this missile can target U.S. bases in Okinawa and northern Luzon. The PLA Rocket Force reportedly fields at least two brigades equipped with DF-16s, possibly totaling several hundred missiles.

DF-21: With a range of up to 2,150 km (about 1,336 miles), variants include nuclear-capable models and the DF-21D anti-ship missile. While older models are being phased out, remaining versions can still target almost all U.S. bases in Japan.

DF-26: With a range of 5,000 km (about 3,107 miles), this missile can strike Guam and both land and maritime targets. As of 2024, China has at least 140 DF-26s, spread across at least six brigades.

Land-Based Cruise Missiles: The PLA’s CJ-10 series, mainly modeled on the Russian Kh-55 and U.S. Tomahawk, can reach 2,000 km (about 1,243 miles). Stockpiles could number in the hundreds.

These land-based missiles are likely to be the primary weapons the PLA would use in an attack on U.S. bases. In response, the United States is developing the so-called Golden Dome defense system.

While China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and threatening the U.S. mainland, the CCP is deeply concerned about the risk of decapitation strikes. As a result, the likelihood of China initiating a nuclear war remains low.

Air-Launched Attacks (Limited Role)

The PLA’s H-6 bombers, capable of carrying CJ-20 cruise missiles, could participate in saturation attacks, though each aircraft is limited to carrying between two and four missiles.

Fighter jets such as the J-16 and J-10 may deploy KD-88 air-to-ground missiles with a range of about 200 km (124 miles), but their short range and high vulnerability make large-scale use unlikely.

Drones like the GJ-11, Wing Loong-10, and TB-001 could be deployed in large numbers as decoys to overwhelm U.S. air defenses. The U.S. military is capable of countering this threat by using the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) and the Indirect Fire Protection Capability–High-Powered Microwave Systems (IFPC-HPM), both of which are relatively low-cost solutions.

PLA Navy destroyers might also carry cruise missiles, but in a Taiwan conflict scenario, their primary role would likely be to escort amphibious forces and engage U.S. naval assets, rather than attack land bases.

Drone Swarm Attacks Inspired by Ukraine

On June 1, Ukraine launched a drone attack inside Russia, dubbed “Operation Spider’s Web.” This action has prompted countries around the world to reassess how to defend their own critical infrastructure from enemy attacks.
On June 6, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the “Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty” executive order in response to the threats posed by the misuse of drones.
If the PLA were to prepare an attack on U.S. bases, it might plan simultaneous drone strikes to maximize confusion and weaken America’s defensive and retaliatory capabilities. Similar drone attacks may also be carried out on U.S. soil, including in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and other locations.

US Readiness and Countermeasures

The United States has already taken steps to prepare.

Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan, the closest U.S. airbase to Taiwan, is transitioning from F-15C fighter jets to the more advanced F-15EX multi-role fighters. Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force also operates F-15Js out of Kadena. At Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, U.S. forces have permanently stationed F-35B fighters and carrier-based squadrons, including F-35Cs. Meanwhile, Misawa Air Base is replacing its F-16s with F-35A fighters, which are flown by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force stationed there.

In the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict, aircraft from all three U.S. bases could quickly redeploy south to join the fight. Additional reinforcements, including F-22s and F-35s based in Alaska and Hawaii, would arrive rapidly—some redeploying to these three bases, others possibly to Guam, Tinian, Palau, the Philippines, or South Korea.

In short, the United States has adopted a strategy of dispersed and dynamic deployment to ensure it can retaliate from multiple locations. This makes it harder for China to launch a successful saturation strike against any single target and helps minimize potential losses.

Missile Defense

Both U.S. forces and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are equipped with Patriot missile defense systems, while destroyers on both sides are outfitted with Aegis combat systems, capable of intercepting most PLA ballistic and cruise missiles.

In addition, the U.S. THAAD system deployed in South Korea and the large radar installation at Leshan in Taiwan provide early warning of Chinese missile launches.

However, if the PLA were to launch a saturation strike on one or two key bases, it could potentially overwhelm the U.S.–Japan missile defense network, allowing some missiles to penetrate and hit their targets. The most likely target would be Okinawa, as the limited range of some Chinese missile systems would make saturation attacks on more distant bases very difficult to execute.

In such a scenario, China might concentrate all its DF-16 ballistic missiles on Okinawa, supplemented by large numbers of CJ-10 cruise missiles and a portion of its DF-21s, or even DF-26s. H-6 bombers could also launch some CJ-20 cruise missiles. The PLA would likely use cruise missiles and large swarms of drones as decoys, hoping to exhaust U.S. air defenses and allow some ballistic missiles to get through.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the U.S. response would depend on whether its counter-drone systems can handle the scale of a mass drone attack, and whether the Patriot and Aegis systems can withstand a large-scale missile assault.

Fighter Response

With advance warning, the roughly 300 U.S. and Japanese fighter jets could take off in time to avoid being destroyed on the ground and participate in missile defense operations. If even half were committed to the defense, they could shoot down many PLA cruise missiles and drones, easing the burden on ground-based air defense systems.

The Prospect of a Preemptive Strike

Waiting for a Chinese first strike would be a passive, risky, and potentially dangerous move. A U.S. preemptive attack, such as striking PLA Rocket Force bases before launch, could prevent widespread devastation.

The best window for such action would be during the mobilization of Chinese missile units. Stealth bombers like the B-2, potentially armed with tactical nuclear weapons such as the B61, could target key sites. Additionally, U.S. forces in the Philippines, Guam, and those aboard submarines and Aegis ships could launch cruise missile strikes. If well prepared, bombers could also carry AGM-158 air-to-ground missiles for rapid strikes against coastal PLA Rocket Force bases and airfields.

Another option could be to disable China’s Beidou satellite system, which guides its missiles, providing a less escalatory way to mitigate an attack.

However, preemptive action raises significant legal and political challenges. Washington must clarify how command decisions would be made in extreme scenarios. Should the United States wait for China to fire the first shot, or act proactively to prevent another Pearl Harbor?

The U.S. secretary of defense knows that the Chinese regime is preparing for an attack and could do just about anything. The U.S. military is also preparing, but it still depends on timely authorization from the White House and Congress.
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Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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