Hutchison Port Holdings and Panama Canal: Tip of the Iceberg of China’s Hegemonic Ambition

Udumbara Udumbara
Apr 10, 2025 - 09:59 Updated: Apr 9, 2025 - 18:47
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Hutchison Port Holdings and Panama Canal: Tip of the Iceberg of China’s Hegemonic Ambition

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Commentary

Communist China’s control over global ports has far-reaching implications for global trade, security, and geopolitics. They also raise concerns about potential coercion and the possibility of dual-use military applications.

Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH) is a subsidiary of CK Hutchison Holdings, a Hong Kong-based global corporation. HPH operates 53 ports across 24 countries on five continents. The numerous port operations allow the Chinese regime to exert economic influence and apply political leverage across those 24 countries. Furthermore, these operations facilitate data and intelligence collection while maintaining strategic control through chokepoints like the Panama Canal.

The recent decision to sell their operations in Balboa and Cristobal to BlackRock has met with the expected wrath of Chinese media and chastising from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

But HPH isn’t the only piece in China’s global shipping network. China Merchants Port Holdings (CM Port) includes 46 key hubs in Asia, Africa, the Americas, Oceania, Europe, and the Mediterranean. One of CM Port’s most important operations is the Djibouti Port. Near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, it serves as a critical chokepoint for global shipping and supports China’s military base in Djibouti, enhancing CCP influence in Africa.

Cosco Shipping operates a vast network of ports and shipping routes, including four strategically important European ports. China’s investments in European ports, such as Piraeus in Greece and Zeebrugge in Belgium, have created a level of dependency on Chinese capital and management. This dependency could limit the EU’s strategic autonomy in critical infrastructure, and CCP influence has certainly been linked politically. In 2017, Greece vetoed an EU statement on the Chinese regime’s human rights record, an action deemed to be related to China’s investment in Piraeus.

Given that Cosco operates a port in Seattle, Washington, and two in California (Long Beach and Los Angeles), it is plausible that China would exert similar pressure on these two West Coast states, should it serve CCP interests.
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While Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC) doesn’t control port operations, it supplies just under 80 percent of the ship-to-shore cranes used in the United States. ZPMC has its own service operations in the United States, which are managed by ZPMC USA, a subsidiary of ZPMC North America. They handle maintenance, repairs, and upgrades for ZPMC equipment, including digital systems.
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Reliance on ZPMC for upgrades and maintenance has sparked concerns among members of the House Committee on Homeland Security. “By potentially sacrificing long-term economic security for short-term financial gain, we have given the CCP the ability to track the movement of goods through our ports or even halt port activity at the drop of a hat,” the committee said in a report.
Chinese entities have acquired equity ownership or operational stakes in 129 port projects worldwide, 45 in Asia, 25 in Europe, 20 in Africa, 15 in North America, 14 in South America, and 10 in Oceania. It holds majority ownership in 17 ports, and 14 of those have significant naval purposes.

Africa is garnering significant attention, as China is positioned to establish more dual-use ports like that in Djibouti. Reporting indicates that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has made 55 port calls and 19 bilateral and multilateral exercises in Africa since 2000. Beijing’s national strategy includes a “Two Oceans” approach, a key objective for projecting maritime power beyond the first island chain.

In the Indian Ocean, the PLA Navy has expanded its presence to protect critical sea lanes, particularly those linked to China’s energy imports and trade routes. This includes the military base in Djibouti and securing access to ports like Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka.

Regarding the Pacific Ocean, the PLA Navy aims to secure its near seas (the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea) while extending its reach into the broader Pacific. This may explain the controversial exercises developing blue-water capabilities—such as aircraft carriers and advanced submarines—to challenge U.S. dominance in the region.

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Conclusion

China’s straightforward investments in port infrastructure led to predictable outcomes, such as increased trade and economic growth. However, underlying strategic goals may be overlooked in view of short-term economic gains through contracts under the CCP’s Belt and Road Initiative. This is especially true when weighing CCP’s majority interest in strategic ports and the potential for commercial and military purposes. Furthermore, geopolitical tensions and trade disputes are likely to create chaotic situations.

China’s extensive control over global ports, achieved through state-affiliated companies and strategic investments, has profound implications for global trade, security, and geopolitics. While these investments drive economic growth and connectivity, they also raise concerns about potential coercion and dual-use military purposes. China’s YJ-18C cruise missile has a variant that can be stored and launched from a shipping container. Delivery and storage of this type of system would be virtually invisible at any port where ZPMC handles ship-to-shore operations.

Additionally, the potential to hold logistics databases hostage or redirect critical resources and products presents a significant response dilemma for the American civilian sector. Policymakers and stakeholders worldwide must carefully navigate the multifaceted implications of the CCP’s port influence to ensure a balanced and secure global maritime landscape.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

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