Chinese Leader Xi’s Final Spasms of Power Being Caught in a Tightening Net—Now What?

Xi Jinping’s battle to remain in power, even nominally, was reaching its denouement by the end of August, even as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities were already undertaking national management without him.

Now, the question becomes one about the future of the CCP and how it manages the People’s Republic of China during a turbulent period of economic collapse. Will the CCP become more ideological to preserve its legitimacy, while at the same time becoming more open to market forces? How long can it survive, even as foreign powers, including the United States, attempt to stabilize the situation to minimize global economic consequences?

Xi’s final spasms of resistance, not yet over, were, at the end of August, being met resolutely by his opposition within the CCP, and his last remaining supporters were being removed. Some, however, such as Premier Li Qiang, Cai Qi (first-ranked member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party, fifth-ranked member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, and the director of the CCP General Office), and first-ranked Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang, are being closely watched to determine whether they could support a last-minute resurgence by Xi to seize back power. The remaining supporters of Xi in these high-level positions were appointed by him and essentially have nowhere to go when he loses power.

The CCP elders, at their secretive annual meeting at Beidaihe resort, had already, in early August, given the green light for the senior vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Gen. Zhang Youxia, to undertake military action as needed to cut Xi from any chain of command access.

It is probable that the final announcement of the transfer of power, perhaps given in softer political terms, would be announced at the Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee in October. The plan, according to sources at the Beidaihe gathering, was to announce Xi’s voluntary retirement due to health concerns.

But there is no doubt that Xi’s opponents—particularly focusing on Hu Jintao (general secretary from 2002 to 2012, and CCP top leader from 2003 to 2013)—feel that the survival of the CCP itself is dependent upon the successful overthrow of Xi. And there are still a number of Xi supporters who could attempt to intervene on behalf of Xi. The battle lines have been drawn now for some months, and the players on each side have been identified.

The nature of the July 30 announcement regarding the Fourth Plenary Session date was done in such a way that it essentially dismissed the importance of Xi, so he is aware that the Party feels confident in its ability to remove him. Indeed, he has been negotiating the terms of his survival, even while attempting to determine whether he has the basis, politically and within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), for a counter-coup.

Gen. Zhang, meanwhile, was to be the key member of a special operations team to execute the transition from a military standpoint, supported by retired Gen. Liu Yuan, who has been brought back for the operation. The process would include further constraining Xi’s freedom of movement and the containment of his family. This would, at some imminent time, include restricting Xi’s contact with foreign leaders and with his domestic supporters. His appearances through August were already carefully circumscribed.

Xi’s ability to give orders to the PLA and security forces through the normal chain of command would then be finally cut. The PLA would then assume full control of the media.

But all this begs the question of what happens next to China. How long would the façade of the People’s Republic of China remain? Even if that shell remains, would China remain effectively unified, or break back into de facto warlordism, with key military districts resembling the fiefdoms that prevailed from the end of the Qing Dynasty around 1912 and persisted well into the Maoist era of China after 1949?

Will the post-Xi CCP—probably to be led as general secretary (and leader of the PRC) by Wang Yang, who had served as the chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference from 2018 to 2023—have an interim period of calm to help rebuild the economy and dampen popular unrest?

Quite possibly, but Wang, 70, would probably be an interim figure (Xi himself is two years older, at 72)— acceptable to many factions, but not seen as disruptive or doing anything other than helping mend the collapse of mainland Chinese society.

Wang would be supported by Hu Chunchua, 62, former vice-premier (2018–2023), who, it would be assumed, could become premier.

But Zhang cannot be expected just to fade away. He has proven courageous and capable in resisting and removing Xi, and in doing so, has fulfilled a role that the Party elders could not fulfill without him. Will his influence become critical after the transition? He is the son of a first-generation PLA general, and therefore may harbor hopes of a more strategically powerful position. Could he become the chairman of the Central Military Commission, a post normally reserved for the general secretary of the Party?

Even now, by default, Zhang is seen as the kingmaker post-Xi. That also makes him the principal target of the Xi faction as it fights from its corner to retain power.

Meanwhile, the theater continues: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) met in Tianjin from Aug. 31 to Sept. 1, with a summit to include Xi, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Xi was the nominal host. The CCP had no option but to allow that, and, indeed, insist on it to show continuity within the CCP leadership. But the CCP elders—including Zhang—were expected to observe his actions and statements at that event.

The SCO itself has—like the BRICS forum—lost any sense of meaningful coordinated action, other than representing a forum for Eurasian states to gather, despite the mutual hostility of many of its members. The statements at the SCO proved, as expected, to be more theater than substance, but the forum and the Sept. 3 military parade in Beijing were telling as to how quietly Xi himself will go to the gallows. He appeared lackluster at both events and did not appear to attempt any last-minute acts to stave off the Party’s determination for him to move out of his “lifetime” leadership mission. But the CCP old guard will clearly not sleep well until the transition is finally undertaken.