China’s Threats Against Taiwan Strengthens Taiwan’s Willingness to Deter Beijing
Communist China’s escalated coercion of Taiwan has, in turn, strengthened the self-governed island’s resolve to resist Beijing’s threats, according to a new report by Australia’s Centre for Defence Research. The paper, called ‘On Chinese Deterrence Thought and Practice Circa 2022,’ published on Nov. 25, in the Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies, shed light on China’s concepts and practices of coercion, like deterrence and the implications of those behaviours in a Taiwan crisis scenario. The author argued that China’s coercive actions against Taiwan as part of its “One China policy” “abrogate the basic engine of coercive diplomacy.” Crucially, the goal of coercive diplomacy is to convince the coerced state that “if it resists, it will suffer, but if it concedes, it will not.” However, if ‘it suffers either way or if it has already suffered all it can, then it will not concede, and coercion will fail,’” the report noted. “Here, China’s current behaviour provides Taiwan with ample proof that it will suffer regardless of whether it resists or concedes to Beijing’s coercion. “As a result, Taiwan’s resolve has arguably been strengthened.” The report comes three months after China carried out its largest-ever military exercise around Taiwan following a visit earlier in August by U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. The Chinese government has been condemned for violating Taiwan’s territorial waters and air defence identification zone when it launched missiles over Taiwan and staged blockade drills around the island. Commenting on China’s military exercise, Taiwan envoy to U.S. Hsiao Bi-khim said it’s “generating so much attention and sympathy” towards Taiwan’s situation and spurring “greater interest than ever” in visiting the island, Reuters reported on Aug. 18. Hsiao also told CBS on Aug. 7 that China’s attempt at coercion would increase greater efforts at both “fortifying our own defences” and “foreign military sales projects with the United States.” Deterrence With Chinese Characteristics The report also said that the deterrence “with ‘Chinese characteristics’”—called 威慑 (wēi shè) in Mandarin—is framed as “an instrument for the achievement of politico-military objectives” rather than as a goal of policy. It also has two functions the report noted: “‘One is to stop the other party from doing what they want to do through deterrence’ (i.e. dissuasion), and ‘the other is to use deterrence to coerce the other party to do what they must do’ (i.e. compellence).” This can be seen in the “dual nature” of the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy to dissuade Washington from intervening should China choose to use force across the Taiwan Strait while forcing Taipei to accept its concept and model of “reunification,” the report noted. “From Beijing’s perspective, then, the current political trends–if left unchecked– threaten its worst-case scenario: a U.S. that abrogates ‘strategic ambiguity’ and a Taiwan that is domestically united on de facto (if not de jure) independence,” the report said. “The problem for Beijing is that the current political trendlines on the Taiwan issue are contrary to its objectives, as the Tsai Ing-wen government moves away from anything resembling a ‘One China’ perspective, and Taiwanese society sees the solidification of Taiwanese national identity and declining support for any notion of ‘reunification’ with the Chinese mainland.” China’s Deterrence Across A Peacetime-Crisis-War Spectrum The report further noted that deterrence with Chinese characteristics spans from peacetime to crisis and wartime. During peacetime, deterrence is “mainly the use of national military power, combined with political, economic, diplomatic, technological, cultural and other strategic forces to influence the development of the situation and delay or stop the outbreak of war,” the report noted. This could be seen in China’s imposition of new trade blocks on Taiwan and economic sanctions on Australia after Australia called for an independent investigation into the origin COVID-19, as well as the Chinese government’s use of social media channels like TikTok to expand soft power and collect citizens’ data. “In crisis situations, in turn, the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) will adopt a high-intensity deterrence posture, to show a strong resolve of willingness to fight and powerful actual strength, to force an opponent to promptly reverse course,’” the report said. “Use of deterrence ‘may delay the outbreak of war and create conditions for the country to make other political choices and prepare for war. “But if ‘war is imminent, deterrence ‘can either seize the last chance to avoid war, or gain the initiative in the war, especially the first battle, and create a favourable military situation for entering a state of war.” The author noted that information on the Chinese understanding of deterrence detailed in the report is derived from such documents as Chinese defence white
Communist China’s escalated coercion of Taiwan has, in turn, strengthened the self-governed island’s resolve to resist Beijing’s threats, according to a new report by Australia’s Centre for Defence Research.
The paper, called ‘On Chinese Deterrence Thought and Practice Circa 2022,’ published on Nov. 25, in the Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies, shed light on China’s concepts and practices of coercion, like deterrence and the implications of those behaviours in a Taiwan crisis scenario.
The author argued that China’s coercive actions against Taiwan as part of its “One China policy” “abrogate the basic engine of coercive diplomacy.”
Crucially, the goal of coercive diplomacy is to convince the coerced state that “if it resists, it will suffer, but if it concedes, it will not.” However, if ‘it suffers either way or if it has already suffered all it can, then it will not concede, and coercion will fail,’” the report noted.
“Here, China’s current behaviour provides Taiwan with ample proof that it will suffer regardless of whether it resists or concedes to Beijing’s coercion.
“As a result, Taiwan’s resolve has arguably been strengthened.”
The report comes three months after China carried out its largest-ever military exercise around Taiwan following a visit earlier in August by U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi.
The Chinese government has been condemned for violating Taiwan’s territorial waters and air defence identification zone when it launched missiles over Taiwan and staged blockade drills around the island.
Commenting on China’s military exercise, Taiwan envoy to U.S. Hsiao Bi-khim said it’s “generating so much attention and sympathy” towards Taiwan’s situation and spurring “greater interest than ever” in visiting the island, Reuters reported on Aug. 18.
Hsiao also told CBS on Aug. 7 that China’s attempt at coercion would increase greater efforts at both “fortifying our own defences” and “foreign military sales projects with the United States.”
Deterrence With Chinese Characteristics
The report also said that the deterrence “with ‘Chinese characteristics’”—called 威慑 (wēi shè) in Mandarin—is framed as “an instrument for the achievement of politico-military objectives” rather than as a goal of policy.
It also has two functions the report noted: “‘One is to stop the other party from doing what they want to do through deterrence’ (i.e. dissuasion), and ‘the other is to use deterrence to coerce the other party to do what they must do’ (i.e. compellence).”
This can be seen in the “dual nature” of the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy to dissuade Washington from intervening should China choose to use force across the Taiwan Strait while forcing Taipei to accept its concept and model of “reunification,” the report noted.
“From Beijing’s perspective, then, the current political trends–if left unchecked– threaten its worst-case scenario: a U.S. that abrogates ‘strategic ambiguity’ and a Taiwan that is domestically united on de facto (if not de jure) independence,” the report said.
“The problem for Beijing is that the current political trendlines on the Taiwan issue are contrary to its objectives, as the Tsai Ing-wen government moves away from anything resembling a ‘One China’ perspective, and Taiwanese society sees the solidification of Taiwanese national identity and declining support for any notion of ‘reunification’ with the Chinese mainland.”
China’s Deterrence Across A Peacetime-Crisis-War Spectrum
The report further noted that deterrence with Chinese characteristics spans from peacetime to crisis and wartime.
During peacetime, deterrence is “mainly the use of national military power, combined with political, economic, diplomatic, technological, cultural and other strategic forces to influence the development of the situation and delay or stop the outbreak of war,” the report noted.
This could be seen in China’s imposition of new trade blocks on Taiwan and economic sanctions on Australia after Australia called for an independent investigation into the origin COVID-19, as well as the Chinese government’s use of social media channels like TikTok to expand soft power and collect citizens’ data.
“In crisis situations, in turn, the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) will adopt a high-intensity deterrence posture, to show a strong resolve of willingness to fight and powerful actual strength, to force an opponent to promptly reverse course,’” the report said.
“Use of deterrence ‘may delay the outbreak of war and create conditions for the country to make other political choices and prepare for war.
“But if ‘war is imminent, deterrence ‘can either seize the last chance to avoid war, or gain the initiative in the war, especially the first battle, and create a favourable military situation for entering a state of war.”
The author noted that information on the Chinese understanding of deterrence detailed in the report is derived from such documents as Chinese defence white papers, and the Science of Military Strategy, published biennially by the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences.