China’s ‘Full-Time Grandchildren’ Trend Highlights Youth Unemployment

China’s ‘Full-Time Grandchildren’ Trend Highlights Youth Unemployment
.

As China’s economy continues to slow and youth unemployment remains high, a growing number of young people are turning to an unconventional career path—becoming full-time caregivers for their grandparents.

Dubbed as “full-time grandchildren,” this trend has taken off on Chinese social media, where disillusioned Gen Zers, especially those born after 2000, share stories of abandoning the ultra-competitive urban job market to return to their hometowns and care for aging relatives.

The shift follows earlier phenomena such as “full-time children,” where grown-up children stay home and get paid to take care of their parents.
Experts say that the creation of these new terms is just another way of saying that a large number of young people in China are unemployed.

A ‘Job’ of Desperation

For many, becoming a “full-time grandchild” is not a lifestyle choice but a reluctant retreat from China’s highly competitive job market that offers few alternatives.
In a widely shared story on Chinese social media, 23-year-old Xiao Ru (nickname) left her job in a major city and moved back to her hometown in northeastern China to care for her grandparents.

“Working out there [in big cities] drained my entire family’s savings, and I couldn’t even save much myself,” she said on a WeChat-based channel. “If I weren’t here, my grandparents would need to hire a caregiver anyway. At least I’m family, and they feel more at ease.”

For Xiao Ru and many like her, moving back home offers both emotional comfort and a modest economic solution since their accommodation would be essentially covered by their grandparents.

In other words, many young people would prefer to live with their grandparents for free while looking after them. In some cases, retirees with generous pensions even pay their grandchildren for their caregiving work.

The current trend on Chinese social media shows many young people posting videos documenting their daily routines, including shopping for groceries, cooking, doing housework, drinking milk tea with their grandparents, and even practicing yoga together.

Privilege for Only Some

However, experts warn that the “full-time grandchild” role is only available to a privileged few.

“This isn’t a sustainable or universal solution,” Geng Lutao, a former educational professional in China, told The Epoch Times. “Only middle-class families, especially those with retired government workers or state enterprise officials, can afford this arrangement. Most Chinese retirees receive just a few hundred yuan (around US$100) a month, which is barely enough to support themselves, let alone a grandchild.”

Li Yuanhua, a Chinese scholar now based in Australia, told The Epoch Times, “This may solve some individual family issues, but it is not a solution [for society]. This only temporarily relieves financial burdens for families with seniors who have higher pensions. For most [of China’s] elderly, pensions are extremely low, and they can’t even support themselves.”

Disappearing Opportunities

The rise of “full-time grandchildren” is unfolding against the backdrop of a deeply troubled job market.
China’s National Bureau of Statistics data show that urban unemployment for 16 to 24-year-olds (excluding students) stood at 14.9 percent in May, after months of hovering around 15 to 17 percent. In July 2023, the government abruptly stopped publishing youth unemployment data after it reached a record 21.3 percent. Although data reporting was resumed in January 2024, critics argue that the figures were manipulated to understate the problem.
.
According to an article widely circulated in Chinese media by Peking University associate professor Zhang Dandan, if one includes so-called “lying flat” youth—those who have given up looking for work or rely entirely on parents—the real youth unemployment rate may have reached as high as 46.5 percent in early 2023.
Lying flat,” or “tang ping” in Chinese slang, is an online buzzword that emerged in China in 2021. It refers to a passive attitude toward addressing life and work challenges.

“The job market is collapsing,” Geng said. “Small and medium-sized enterprises were decimated during the three years of pandemic lockdowns. Now, with high housing prices and consumer prices, and stagnant wages, even highly educated young people cannot find jobs. Degrees are being devalued, and upward social mobility is vanishing.”

Both Geng and Li point to deeper structural issues, citing the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) suppression of private enterprises and freedom of expression as key factors.

“This kind of institutional oppression is the real reason young people are giving up [in urban job markets] and going back home,” Geng said. “It’s not a return to traditional family values. [Instead], it’s a quiet retreat after [the CCP’s] systemic failure.”

State Propaganda Narrative

While some in the Chinese state media portray “full-time grandchildren” as society’s return to traditional Chinese values of filial devotion, critics argue that this framing serves to mask the gravity of the regime’s economic and social crisis under the CCP.

“This is just a beautified version of relying on your elders for survival,” Geng said. “It is not a solution. [Instead], it is a coping mechanism, and the CCP is using it to shift blame and tell young people that they can make a living as long as they obey and not question the regime’s policies.”

He added, “The CCP wants to distract from their systemic failure by selling this illusion of dignity in dependency, but it is just another form of brainwashing—training young people to accept a life of passive obedience.”

Li also warned of long-term consequences, “The longer these young people remain outside the workforce, the harder it will be for them to reintegrate, even if job opportunities improve, because they are being pushed into an early retirement from life itself.”

Xia Song and Yi Ru contributed to this report. 
 
 
.