China’s Belt and Road Dams: Ambitious Projects With Questionable Benefits

Commentary

As part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has helped build numerous large-scale hydropower dams worldwide, pursuing a clear political agenda to expand its global influence.

Chinese state media often tout these projects as the “Three Gorges Project” of a given country, even though China’s own Three Gorges Dam has been widely criticized for causing severe ecological damage.

For example, Sudan’s Merowe Dam has been dubbed “Sudan’s Three Gorges,” while projects in Ecuador, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Bolivia, and beyond have received similar labels.

Detailed analyses of these projects often reveal that they are largely unprofitable ventures—driven more by prestige, influence, and propaganda than practical returns.

.

Political Power Over Profit

Politically, the BRI, also known as One Belt, One Road, is a cornerstone of the global strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is designed to promote its governance model, tout the so-called superiority of socialism, and advance narratives such as the “rise of the East, decline of the West” and “a community of shared future for mankind.”

What is the ultimate goal?

To create a new world order that is shaped, influenced, and controlled by the CCP.

In other words, the CCP uses debt, technology transfers, and infrastructure as soft power or leverage tools.

Economically, the BRI helps absorb China’s surplus industrial capacity and labor, while securing long-term control over critical global infrastructure.

How does China dominate the global dam-building market?

The Chinese regime operates with a clear focus on its objectives. Another key factor is how China operates under the CCP’s unified command to carry out a large-scale project through a coordinated effort. This approach integrates diplomacy, finance, propaganda, education, national security, and state-owned enterprises into a cohesive strategy. In the field of international dam construction, for example, early pioneers like the Three Gorges Group and Gezhouba Group have been consolidated into the Power Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina), backed by state-owned banks such as the Export-Import Bank of China.

This “military-style” deployment leaves most private foreign competitors in the dust. As the saying goes: “Wherever they go, no grass grows”—a euphemism for wiping out competition.

Moreover, many foreign private companies have long been co-opted by the CCP, leveraging their so-called independent status to advance Beijing’s interests.

.

China’s Dominance in Global Hydropower Construction Market

At the China Hydropower Development Forum held in Beijing on Jan. 8, 2019, officials revealed that Chinese companies had come to dominate more than 70 percent of the global hydropower construction market. Conservative estimates place China’s overseas investment in hydropower at over 200 billion yuan (about $28 billion), spanning more than 40 countries and regions along the Belt and Road.

According to a November 2023 report by state-owned Chinese company PowerChina, since the launch of the BRI in 2013, Chinese companies have been involved in more than 300 hydropower projects abroad, with a total installed capacity exceeding 100 million kilowatts—more than 4.44 times that of the Three Gorges Dam, which stands at 22.5 million kilowatts.

In some countries, China has helped build not just one but multiple “Three Gorges Projects.” For example, Sudan has the Merowe Dam (featured on the 100 Sudanese pound banknotes), the upgraded Roseires Dam, and the Upper Atbara Dam. Ethiopia is home to the Tekeze Dam, Gibe III Dam, and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Inga III project stands out for its sheer scale—its generating capacity is twice that of the Three Gorges Dam, and its annual output is three times greater. It’s been dubbed the “Super Three Gorges Project.”

Hydropower is merely one facet of the BRI’s massive infrastructure ambitions. Chinese state-owned enterprises are also actively constructing highways, railways, airports, seaports, communication networks, and water infrastructure worldwide.

.

Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam Versus China’s Three Gorges

Take the Grand Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia as an example. Like the Three Gorges, it’s a concrete gravity dam, but it uses roller-compacted concrete instead of the traditional poured type. It stands at a height of 558 feet (170 meters) and a length of 5.906 feet (1,800 meters), compared to Three Gorges’ height of 591 feet (180 meters) and length of 7,661 feet (2,335 meters). Its reservoir spans 695 square miles (1,800 km²), larger than Three Gorges’ 425 square miles (1,100 km²).

Its generating capacity is 6.7 million kilowatts—significantly less than Three Gorges’ 22.5 million kilowatts—but still the largest in Africa. It costs about $4.8 billion, including transmission infrastructure. Compare that to the Three Gorges’ $30 billion (excluding transmission). Ethiopia’s dam costs roughly $716 per kilowatt of installed capacity, which is about half the unit cost of the Three Gorges Dam when transmission is included.

This shows that, despite securing numerous contracts with attractive pricing and bundled financing, most of these “Three Gorges Projects” along the BRI are economically unprofitable, leading to poor investment returns.

This raises an important question: Why are the per-kilowatt costs of overseas dams significantly lower than those of similar projects in China?

.

‘Great National Instruments’

Chinese leader Xi Jinping may have given us a hint. During a 2018 inspection of the Three Gorges Dam, he called it a “great national instrument” and emphasized that “true national instruments must be firmly held in our own hands.”

Large and mega-scale reservoir and dam projects are among the most critical infrastructure, controlling the lifeblood of a nation—they are truly “great national instruments.” If the CCP insists on maintaining its grip over these projects, the BRI countries will also seek to gain control over their great national instruments. By then, whether CCP-owned banks can recoup their investments remains a question that only a miracle could answer.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

.