China Keeps a Low Profile at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue: Strategic Withdrawal or Tactical Retreat?

However, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s decision to replace Defense Minister Dong Jun with a delegation from the National Defense University (NDU) signals a shift in approach, which is likely driven by heightened tensions, particularly following the 2025 Balikatan Military Exercise, which expanded multinational military cooperation in the region.

Military Cooperation and the Balikatan Effect

Several Balikatan 2025 participants—the United States, Philippines, Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada—also attended the Shangri-La Dialogue. These nations’ leaders continue to pledge military cooperation in response to the malign intentions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the South China Sea and Taiwan, along with its continued coercive economic tactics.

South China Sea Disputes

The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia face territorial expansion efforts, leading to frequent maritime confrontations with China. The CCP has consistently downplayed direct confrontations with Southeast Asian nations while asserting its territorial claims.

For example, when faced with international legal rulings against Beijing’s claims, such as the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling favoring the Philippines, the CCP dismissed the ruling outright rather than engage in a legal battle that would have forced concessions.

Taiwan Tensions

The United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom remain vocal over the Chinese regime’s military posturing around Taiwan, while the regime increases its presence through drills near the island. China frequently conducts military exercises near Taiwan to assert its position while it avoids direct military conflict. This allows Beijing to project strength without escalating tensions to a level where it might suffer diplomatic setbacks.

Economic Coercion

Australia and Canada have accused China of deploying trade restrictions as a means of geopolitical pressure. Beijing’s coercion campaign against Australia (2020–2024) was triggered by Canberra’s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 and its ban on Huawei’s 5G technology. In response, China imposed trade restrictions on key Australian exports.

The Chinese regime’s coercion against Canada intensified after the Canadian authorities arrested Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou in 2018 at the request of the United States. In retaliation, China banned Canadian canola imports, restricted pork and beef imports, and detained two Canadian citizens (Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor) in what was widely viewed as hostage diplomacy.

Cybersecurity Threats

Balikatan 2025 incorporated a cyber defense exercise in response to concerns over China’s cyber activities, particularly in military networks.

With Balikatan reinforcing U.S. alliances and expanding regional deterrence, China likely saw the Shangri-La Dialogue as an unfavorable setting, where historic rhetoric on security might face heightened scrutiny and pushback.

Why the National Defense University Instead of Diplomats?

Instead of sending lower-level diplomats, China’s delegation from NDU reflects Beijing’s intention to maintain a presence without fully engaging in policy debates. Xi likely assessed that lower-level diplomats would struggle to assert the CCP’s strategic position, especially in a forum heavily shaped by U.S.-aligned narratives. NDU representatives do not have to engage in diplomatic activities and can focus on military theory and academic discussions, reducing the risk of confrontations.

Avoiding Hostile Engagement

China recognizes that Shangri-La is increasingly becoming a platform for regional players to counter its policies. Sending high-level defense officials would validate the dialogue, while sending only NDU figures diminishes the forum’s significance in China’s eyes.

Saving Face and Maintaining Stability

Withdrawing from full participation helps to save face, allowing China to avoid situations where officials might be publicly criticized or cornered in discussions. Confucian philosophy emphasizes harmony over confrontation, and China’s tactical absence fits within this framework.

Western leaders may view this differently, as China’s absence could be an intentional attempt to delegitimize Shangri-La as a meaningful platform for Indo-Pacific security discussions. Was Xi taking a realist view, opting for a lower-profile presence to ensure that he did not appear weak or defensive, while also not legitimizing the forum as a space for adversarial narratives?

Strategic Recalibration or Temporary Retreat?

China’s low-profile presence at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue suggests a broader recalibration of its engagement with regional security forums. Xi’s decision to minimize participation follows Balikatan’s expanded military cooperation and may signal a preference for strategic disengagement rather than direct confrontation.